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After a loan covenant violation, creditors can use the threat of accelerating loan payments
and/or terminating credit agreements to extract concessions from borrowers in exchange for con-
tract renegotiation. In practice, creditors rarely need to carry out such threats; most covenant
violations lead to contract renegotiation (Roberts (2015)). Covenant violations enhance credi-
tors’ bargaining position in renegotiations, as shown by the empirical literature on the impact
of violations on firm policies (e.g., Chava and Roberts (2008), Roberts and Sufi (2009), Nini,
Smith, and Sufi (2009, 2012), and Falato and Liang (2016)). This literature describes such an
improvement in creditors’ bargaining power as an increase in “creditor control rights.”1
In this paper, we show that covenant violations trigger changes that have profound effects
on a firm’s governance. Such governance changes in turn magnify the effect of loan covenants
on firm policies, particularly those policies that require the board to behave proactively. By
changing governance, covenant violations can thus have an effect on firm policies many years
after the event, implying that current and past credit agreements have a long-lasting impact
on a firm’s governance.
Our main finding is that firms tend to appoint new independent directors to their boards
following covenant violations. The new directors are typically not replacements for outgoing
directors, implying that board size increases as new directors are appointed. We call the event of
a covenant breach an implied covenant violation, because a violation may not have occurred as a
consequence of covenant waivers obtained through renegotiations. We retain such cases because
renegotiation is one of the mechanisms through which loan covenants can affect firm choices.
The effect of implied covenant violations on the number of independent directors is sizable:
Our baseline specification indicates that a violation leads to a 24% increase in the number of
independent directors. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that covenant violations lead to
changes in board composition.
Our work is related to a number of studies that focus on the impact of creditors and credit
agreements on corporate governance. Gilson (1990) was the first to investigate the influence
of creditors on board composition. He finds evidence that, in negotiated restructurings, banks
influence the appointment of directors both directly and through share ownership. Kaplan
1The term control rights is used informally; a creditor has no legal rights to control the borrower following
a covenant violation.
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and Minton (1994) find that poor financial performance triggers the appointment of former
bank directors to the boards of Japanese firms, which indicates that banks actively influence
corporate governance. Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004) find a negative association between
board independence and the cost of debt, as the presence of independent directors improves the
quality of financial accounting reports. Kroszner and Strahan (2001) and Guner, Malmendier,
and Tate (2008) study the costs and benefits of the presence of bankers on boards and find
evidence of conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders. In this paper, we show
that credit agreements affect board appointments outside bankruptcy, and we provide a causal
estimate of the effect of implied covenant violations on board composition.
Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) show that CEO turnover increases after covenant violations.
Our evidence complements theirs, as we show that the turnover of independent directors is also
a governance mechanism that is available to creditors. However, our evidence is of a different
nature, as we show that the effect of covenant violations on board composition is stronger for
the subset of firms that do not replace their CEOs after a covenant violation. Becker and
Stromberg (2012) show that a 1991 change in the law that required boards to consider the
interests of creditors in financially distressed firms led to an increase in leverage among affected
firms and a reduction in the use of covenants. Their evidence suggests that, as boards become
more likely to consider the interests of creditors, covenants become less important. Our findings
are broadly consistent with this hypothesis.
The finding that loan covenant violations lead to the appointment of new directors to the
board raises a number of questions: Who are these directors? Are they related to creditors? If
so, how are they related? We show that post-violation directors are similar to ordinary directors
in all but one respect: Directors appointed following covenant violations are much more likely
to hold positions in other firms that borrow from the same banks.
What do these new directors do? We find that firms that appoint new directors after
covenant violations are more likely to change certain firm policies that require board initiative.
Such firms are more likely to raise new equity through seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and
invest than firms that violate covenants but do not change their boards, which suggest that
reformed boards are in a better position to address debt overhang problems. In addition, re-
formed boards appear to take actions that decrease payout and operational risk, which alleviate
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concerns about risk-shifting problems. We also find that the structure of CEO compensation
changes after violations. After violations, but without changes to the board, CEOs experience
an increase in cash bonuses that roughly compensates them for a reduction in the value of
equity-based compensation. However, this trend is reversed in firms that appoint new indepen-
dent directors after violations: Cash bonuses fall and equity-based pay increases more than in
firms without such appointments.
To summarize, we find that new directors are more likely to have links to creditors and that
reformed boards are more likely to adopt creditor-friendly policies. We also show that firms
with stronger lending relationships with their creditors appoint more directors in response to
violations than firms without such relationships. The evidence, however, does not settle the
question of whether creditors explicitly intervene in corporate governance issues. It is true that
creditors trigger the process that leads to board changes by declaring a covenant in breach.
However, the process that follows could largely be in the hands of the management or large
shareholders who push for changes in board composition. For example, it could be that, to
improve its negotiation stance, a firm chooses to hire a director who has experience in dealing
with a particular bank.
The reasons for creditors to care about board composition are not obvious. Even if credi-
tors can influence board appointments, directors still owe fiduciary duties to shareholders.2 In
addition, explicit intervention by creditors may force them to owe fiduciary duties to sharehold-
ers or, in the case of bankruptcy, make them subject to equitable subordination (i.e., courts
may treat their claims as subordinate on equitable grounds). Thus, debt contracts typically
do not give creditors explicit rights over board appointments. However, this does not mean
that creditors abstain from corporate governance activism. There is ample anecdotal evidence
of lenders demanding changes to board composition as a consequence of credit renegotiations.3
2However, depending on the company’s charter and state corporate law, a director may also owe fiduciary
duties to other stakeholders, such as creditors, employees, customers and the community. For example, in
Delaware, directors also owe fiduciary duties to creditors in the vicinity of insolvency (see Becker and Stromberg
(2012)).
3For example, a forbearance agreement between BMO Harris Bank and Quadrant 4 System Corporation
required that “the Company appoint(ed) three new directors who were acceptable to the Board and to BMO.”
Similarly, after failing to comply with its financial covenants and other contractual obligations, RCS Capital
Corporation entered an agreement with its lenders, which required “the appointment of an independent director
reasonably acceptable to such lenders.” See the Internet Appendix for more details on these and other examples.
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There are also cases in which a contract renegotiation triggered by a covenant violation is re-
ported alongside the appointment of new independent directors, although no explicit link is
mentioned.4 Baird and Rasmussen (2006) and Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) argue that credi-
tors’ influence on corporate governance is often subtle and exercised behind the scenes, which
makes the empirical documentation of their activities challenging.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. Our results are complementary to
the literature on the effect of loan covenant violations on firm outcomes (Chava and Roberts
(2008), Roberts and Sufi (2009), Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009, 2012), and Falato and Liang
(2016)). Our work shows that credit agreements have long-lasting effects on how firm decisions
are made. Board composition is a means to an end; new directors can influence firm decisions
for many years after their initial appointment.
Our findings also provide direct evidence of the empirical relevance of models of contin-
gent allocation of control rights (e.g., Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994)). In these models, creditors acquire enhanced control rights in low cash flow states. Our
evidence shows that a consequence of such a change in control rights is the appointment of
new “monitors” to the board. The evidence thus suggests that enhanced creditor control rights
strengthen the monitoring role of the board.
We also contribute to the board of directors literature. Although the endogenous nature of
boards is often acknowledged (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)), the literature has been un-
able to provide credible causal estimates of the effect of firm characteristics on board structure.
It has also been difficult to identify firm-level variables that have an economically (rather than
only statistically) significant effect on board composition (see Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo
(2011)). In addition, our results help to explain the observed positive relationship between
leverage and board independence (Boone, Casares Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007), Coles,
Daniel, and Naveen (2008), and Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008)). Our evidence shows that
leverage can directly affect both board independence and size: Highly leveraged firms are more
likely to violate covenants, which may lead to the appointment of new independent directors.
4See, for example, the case of Hooper Holmes in the Internet Appendix.
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1 Data
We construct our sample from the non-financial firms in the Investor Responsibility Research
Center (IRRC) database, from which we obtain board data. We complement the IRRC data
with data on director characteristics from BoardEx. We obtain accounting and segment data
from Compustat and stock returns from CRSP. CEO compensation and tenure data are from
ExecuComp.
We obtain data on syndicated loans from the DealScan database. We restrict the sample
to loans with information on maturity and spread over the LIBOR (all-in spread drawn), and
we eliminate firms with loans for which we do not have any covenant information or that do
not include a covenant on the current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, or debt-to-EBITDA
ratio.
Our main sample uses accounting data from 1994 to 2006 and board data from 1996 to
2008 to allow for lags in our specifications. Data availability determines the beginning of the
sample period; before 1996, there are no IRRC board data. The sample period is determined
by economic considerations. First, we do not include the period of the recent financial crisis,
which led to major changes in bank behavior and regulation, credit market conditions, and
the financial performance of borrowers. Second, until 2006, “covenant-light contracts” were
virtually non-existent, while since 2007, and especially in more recent years, they have rapidly
become common, with nearly 40% of all new loans being covenant-light (Becker and Ivashina
(2016)). Covenant-light contracts normally have the same number of covenants as covenant-
heavy contracts but weaker enforcement. The wide use of covenant-light contracts is thus likely
to attenuate the effect of violations on firm policies. Although our baseline sample includes only
data from 1994 to 2008, the Internet Appendix reports all of our main tests for an extended
sample covering the 1994-2014 period.
For each loan, we first obtain covenant thresholds on the current ratio, net worth, tangible
net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA ratio. We assume that the firm is bound by the covenants
in every quarter until maturity. Since a firm might have more than one active loan in a given
quarter, we use the minimum threshold (or the maximum for the debt-to-EBITDA ratio) for
each covenant across all active loans in a given quarter. We use Compustat data at a quarterly
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frequency to compute the accounting variables. If the accounting variable is equal to or below
the threshold, there is an implied covenant violation. In the case of the debt-to-EBITDA
covenant, an implied covenant violation occurs if the accounting variable is equal to or above
the threshold.
Since some of the relevant accounting variables are ratios and others are measured in dollars,
we measure the distance to the covenant threshold as a proportion of the threshold. We call










where i and t denote firm and year, respectively; j = 1, ..., 4 denotes a quarter of year t;
k = 1, ..., 4 denotes covenant type (one of the four covenant types); z denotes an active loan (a
firm may have more than one loan with covenants); Citjk is the quarterly value of the accounting
variable relevant for covenant k; and Titjkz is the threshold for active loan z, covenant type k,
in quarter j of year t for firm i. Equation (1) applies strictly only to the current ratio, net
worth, and tangible net worth covenants. For the debt-to-EBITDA covenant, D˜itjk is defined
analogously by Titjkz−Citjk. We also calculate an alternative measure of distance to threshold—
called tightness—in which the denominator in equation (2) is the standard deviation of the
accounting variable over the full sample period. We use this variable for additional tests later
in the paper.
Equation (1) implies that an implied covenant violation event is a firm-year observation in
which the firm breaches at least one covenant threshold in at least one quarter of the year. For
expositional simplicity, we allow Dit to assume negative values; a firm-year observation that
displays “negative distance” is an implied covenant violation event.5
Our final (baseline) sample covers 597 firms and 2,801 firm-year observations. For this
5Because EBITDA may assume values that are close to zero or even negative, the debt-to-EBITDA ratio
becomes meaningless in such cases. Thus, we replace negative values with a debt-to-EBITDA ratio equal to its
99th percentile in the sample of positive EBITDA observations. The results show little sensitivity to how such
cases are treated. In particular, the results are similar if all negative EBITDA observations are dropped.
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sample, we find that 51% of the firms have at least one covenant violation during the sample
period (305 firms), and 24% of the firm-year observations include a violation (675 firm-year
observations).6 Because a covenant violation event requires a violation in only one quarter of
the year, the number of observations in violation is mechanically inflated relative to studies
that use quarterly data. At a quarterly frequency, only 16% of the observations in our sample
are violation events.
As in Chava and Roberts (2008) and Falato and Liang (2016), we infer violations from
threshold and accounting data. This procedure may lead to coding and other errors, as well as
possible overstatement of the actual number of violations because we do not consider covenant
threshold renegotiations. Roberts (2015) shows that credit agreements are renegotiated on
average every nine months, often outside violation events. Denis and Wang (2014) show that
covenant thresholds are often renegotiated when firms are close to the threshold. In their
sample, approximately 50% of contracts would be in violation if the original covenants had
not been relaxed. Their results suggest that creditors gain more influence when a firm is close
enough to a covenant threshold that, without renegotiation, the firm would almost certainly
trigger the covenant. We may also misstate the number of actual violations because banks may
waive covenants and because the accounting numbers, such as earnings-based measures and
net worth, used in credit agreements may differ from those reported on financial statements.
In sum, there are a number of possible sources of measurement errors, although we see no a
priori reason to suspect that such errors would bias the results toward finding a positive effect
of covenant violations on board independence.
The debt-to-EBITDA variable can be noisy, as it may vary across contracts depending on
how debt is defined. Because debt-to-EBITDA is the most frequent covenant in our sample,
we face a trade-off: Using this variable substantially increases the variation in the sample, but
it also adds noise. As only few other papers use debt-to-EBITDA covenants (e.g., Demiroglu
and James (2010), Denis and Wang (2014), Freudenberg, Imbierowicz, Saunders, and Steffen
(2017)), we pay special attention to the construction of this variable. We read a sample of 50
credit agreement contracts of borrowers that experienced covenant violations in our sample.
6For comparison, Falato and Liang (2016), who also use data at an annual frequency, find that 21% of their
firm-year observations include a violation event.
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The most common definition of debt is “total consolidated indebtedness,” (e.g., consolidated
gross debt). In only a few cases does debt exclude subordinated debt or is measured net of
cash holdings. In Denis and Wang’s (2014), total debt is also the most common definition of
debt for contracts that establish a debt-to-EBITDA limit. We assume that total debt is equal
to long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. We measure EBITDA as net income minus
extraordinary items, plus income taxes, interest expenses, and depreciation and amortization
(over a test period equal to the four most recent fiscal quarters).
To minimize concerns about measurement errors, in Subsection 3.5, we consider an alterna-
tive definition of violations, which includes only covenant violations registered with the SEC.
This definition has the advantage of eliminating many of the concerns above. There are, how-
ever, two disadvantages: We thereby obtain a severely reduced sample size, and we may miss
many renegotiated violations. Our results, however, appear stronger when we consider only reg-
istered violations, which suggests that, if anything, measurement errors in our original definition
of violations work against finding a positive effect of violations on board independence.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of each variable in our main sample. Table A.1 in the
Appendix provides variable definitions and data sources. The median of the binding distance
is 0.30. The minimum and the maximum of the distance are quite extreme. For example, the
minimum distance in the sample is -7.36 (more than seven times the threshold that triggers
violation), which is one order of magnitude larger than the 10th percentile (-0.63). Even if
these observations are not statistical outliers, it makes little economic sense to use them to
estimate the effects of breaching a covenant threshold. Our empirical approach guarantees that
such extreme values have no effect on our results, since we use (discontinuity) subsamples that
exclude observations that are far from the threshold.
As our sample is constructed mainly by the intersection of three data sources (Compustat,
IRRC, and DealScan), it is instructive to consider how the sample selection procedure affects
the sample and the types of firms included in our study. Relative to studies that use covenant
data from DealScan such as Chava and Roberts (2008), our sample is smaller for two reasons:
the need to match data with the IRRC sample and the use of annual versus quarterly data.
Table IA.1 in the Internet Appendix presents a comparison of the averages of each variable
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across data sources.7 This comparison reveals that firms in our sample are substantially larger
than those in both the Compustat and the DealScan samples, which is expected because IRRC
collects data for S&P 1,500 companies only. Consistent with this fact, our sample has fewer
covenant violations (24%) than the DealScan sample (34%). However, our sample firms are on
average smaller than those in the IRRC sample. This is because larger firms are less likely to
have syndicated loans with restrictive covenants.8 In contrast, sample selection has virtually no
effect on average board characteristics. If anything, our sample has slightly smaller and more
independent boards than the IRRC sample, but such differences are not meaningful.9
Table IA.2 in the Internet Appendix reports descriptive statistics for the value of the ac-
counting variable (Citjk), threshold (Titjkz), binding distance (D˜itjk), and tightness for each
covenant type (at a quarterly frequency). The average current ratio is 2.04, while the corre-
sponding average threshold is significantly lower at 1.41. The average net worth and tangible
net worth are significantly higher than their corresponding thresholds. The debt-to-EBITDA is
the covenant with the lowest absolute distance to the threshold. The average debt-to-EBITDA
is 3.20, while the corresponding average threshold is only slightly higher at 3.49. We conclude
that, as expected, the average firm is not violating any covenant.
Table IA.3 in the Internet Appendix presents covenant tightness at loan origination and
the number and frequency of violations for our sample (at a quarterly frequency), as well as
comparable statistics for the sample in Chava and Roberts (2008). Our sample shows a lower
fraction of observations with covenant violations than that of Chava and Roberts (2008). They
report that 15% of their firm-quarter observations correspond to a violation of the current ratio
covenant and 14% to a violation of the net worth (and tangible net worth) covenant, while
we report 9% and 5%, respectively. This is expected since our sample is smaller and contains
7As Compustat is the primary source for all accounting information, we define the restricted samples by their
intersection with Compustat. Thus, the DealScan sample is defined as all observations in Compustat for which
we could find data on covenants in the DealScan database. Similarly, the IRRC sample contains all firm-year
observations for which data are available in both Compustat and IRRC.
8Despite the restriction imposed by the IRRC data, our firms are not substantially larger on average ($3.5
billion in assets) than those in other studies using loan covenant data, such as Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009)
($3.3 billion) and Denis and Wang (2014) ($2.8 billion).
9To qualify as independent, a director must not be an employee, a former executive, or a relative of a current
corporate executive of the company. In addition, the director must have no business relations with the company.
The statistics for the board variables are also similar to those in other studies using IRRC data (e.g., Ferreira,
Ferreira, and Raposo (2011)).
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larger firms on average due to the use of board data. Conditional on the presence of covenants,
however, the covenant characteristics are similar. In Chava and Roberts’s sample, the average
values for covenant tightness at origination are 1.09 (current ratio) and 0.68 (net worth and
tangible net worth), while in our sample the average values are 1.44 (current ratio), 0.58 (net
worth), and 0.65 (tangible net worth).
2 Methodology
2.1 Empirical Challenges
Our goal is to estimate the average effect of an implied covenant violation on board composi-
tion, conditional on firms having loans with restrictive covenants. We start by clarifying our
terminology. We define the “pure” (in the sense of “uncontaminated”) effect of a violation as
the effect that a violation would have while holding financial performance and other confound-
ing factors constant. The main empirical challenge is to isolate the pure effect of a violation
from the effect of financial performance and other confounding factors.
Following the previous literature (e.g., Chava and Roberts (2008), Roberts and Sufi (2009)),
we call the pure effect of a covenant violation an increase in creditor control rights, where control
rights refer to the informal power that creditors have over the firm in negotiations. Should
negotiation break down after a violation, the creditor typically has the right to exercise the
threat of terminating the credit agreement and requesting repayment of the loan. Controlling
for financial performance and other factors, a violation can affect firm outcomes only because
creditors have the right to make threats that were not possible before the violation. This does
not mean that creditors actually use their enhanced control rights to obtain concessions from
the firm. It could be that management or large shareholders encourage changes in policies in
response to increased creditor control rights (i.e., in response to creditors’ potential to make
threats), even absent any indication that creditors favor a particular policy. We call creditors’
actual use of explicit or implicit threats to obtain changes in policies creditor intervention.
Thus, creditor control rights and creditor intervention are distinct concepts.
Our main goal is to show that an increase in creditor control rights caused by covenant
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violations leads to the appointment of new directors. While we do not provide direct evidence
that creditor intervention leads to the appointment of new directors, our secondary goal is to
analyze the mechanisms in greater detail.
To reduce firm heterogeneity around covenant thresholds, we focus primarily on results
obtained in discontinuity subsamples constructed using narrow windows around the threshold.
However, this approach is arguably not sufficient for addressing firm heterogeneity in our partic-
ular application. There are at least four challenges to apply a standard regression discontinuity
design to our problem:
(1) Sample selection. The probability of firms exiting or entering a sample around the
threshold may be correlated with board composition.
(2) Violations may directly affect the distance to threshold. After violations, if a firm takes
actions that improve the underlying accounting variables, the firm may rapidly exit the violation
sample, creating an unbalanced distribution of observations on either side of the threshold.
(3) The use of ratios as “running” variables. To understand this problem, consider, for
example, the debt-to-EBITDA variable. Most of the variation in this variable comes from its
denominator because earnings vary more than debt. Because debt-to-EBITDA is a convex
function of EBITDA, for a given amount of variation in EBITDA, this ratio will vary more
when it is initially low than when it is initially high. Thus, observations in violation of this
covenant are likely to be farther from the threshold than observations that are not in violation.
This mechanical effect means that any narrow window that is symmetric around the threshold
is more likely to include observations that are not in violation than observations in violation.
(4) Covenant thresholds across firms. Although we normalize all covenant thresholds to
make them comparable across firms, the underlying thresholds are different. Thus, the effects
of violating a covenant might differ across firms because the breach of a tight covenant might
have different implications from the breach of one that is not as tight. An additional issue
arises because covenant thresholds are endogenously chosen (Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel (2009) and
Demiroglu and James (2010)).
To address these concerns, we proceed as follows. First, we use firm fixed effects, which
address the most obvious selection problems and time-invariant omitted variables. Second, we
control for the distance to a violation threshold and for a long list of time-varying firm vari-
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ables, including measures of market and operating performance. Third, we perform balancing
tests that show that observable firm characteristics are either similar on both sides or fully
“explained” by the distance to threshold variable. Finally, if spurious correlations are created
by omitted variables that may jump discontinuously, but not always exactly at the covenant
thresholds, we would expect to find similar results for at least some thresholds that do not
coincide with the actual threshold. To address this issue, we perform placebo tests aimed at
detecting jumps in board independence at other points near the actual covenant thresholds.
2.2 Empirical Model
Our baseline specification is given by





it−2 + αt + fi + δx
′
it−2 + εit, (3)
where yit is either the number of independent directors or the number of non-independent
directors; vit is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if firm i breaches a covenant
threshold in year t (i.e., vit = 1 if Dit ≤ 0);
∑P
p=1 [γp0 + γp1vit]D
p
it is a polynomial of order P of
the distance to threshold, where coefficients γp0 and γp1 can differ on the left- and right-hand
sides of the threshold; αt is a year fixed effect; fi is a firm fixed effect; and xit is a vector of
control variables. Our default option is to cluster standard errors by firm; we obtain similar
standard errors when we cluster by industry or industry-year.
The coefficient of interest is β. Given the log-linear specification, β is a semi-elasticity
and thus has a simple interpretation: β is the percentage change in yit due to a violation.
To facilitate the interpretation of the results, the tables also present the marginal effects of a
violation evaluated at the sample average of yit: ∂yit/∂vit−2 = βy.
We consider either the number of independent directors or the number of non-independent
directors as the outcome variable, not the ratio between them or the ratio of independents to
board size. We choose this approach because it is more informative and general than focusing on
ratios; we can always calculate the effect on the ratio from the effects on the levels. In particular,
ratios do not indicate what happens to board size after violations, while our approach allows
us to infer changes in both the proportion of different types of directors and the total number
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of directors. In the robustness section, we also present results in which yit is the fraction of
independent directors on the board.
We lag all explanatory variables by two years. There are three reasons to expect a lag
between the first covenant violation and changes to the board. First, the date of a covenant
violation (actual or implied) may indicate the start of negotiations between the firm and its
lenders. Such negotiations may result in future agreements, such as new credit or forbearance
agreements. Such agreements may then require (formally or informally) the appointment of
new directors to the board. The lag between an initial covenant violation and a follow-up
agreement which requires board changes can be substantial. In the Internet Appendix, we
describe an example of explicit creditor intervention (Peekay Boutiques Inc.) in which lenders
demand the appointment of new board members in a contract signed two years after the first
violation. There are also cases of lags between an agreement and the date in which new directors
are appointed (see the case of Quadrant 4 System Corporation in the Internet Appendix). And
even when changes occur shortly after a violation, they may still be recorded with a lag of one
year, if the appointment is effective only in the next fiscal year (see the case of RCS Capital
Corporation in which an appointment occurs only five days after the agreement, but in a new
fiscal year).
Second, directors can normally be replaced only at regular intervals of no less than one
year at annual shareholder meetings and often up to three years in the case of firms with
staggered-board provisions in their charters. Typically, new directors have to be nominated
well in advance of annual meetings. State corporate law and a firms’s charter regulate the
appointment of directors. These rules may imply a significant lag between the decision to
appoint a new director and its actual implementation.10
Finally, we note that, because board turnover is typically low, the effect of violations on
appointments is cumulative: The effect in two years is (approximately) the sum of year 1 and
year 2 appointments. In the Internet Appendix, we present estimates using alternative lags.
As is typical in regression discontinuity designs, the sample includes only those observations
for which the absolute value of the binding distance is less than h (the bandwidth). We
10Of course, there are also situations in which appointments can be made quickly, such as when directors
resign or when a new position is created and temporarily filled until the next formal election (e.g., Arena and
Ferris (2007)).
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do not use a theoretically motivated bandwidth selection criterion (for example, Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012)) because some of the necessary assumptions are unlikely to hold in our
application. We choose instead an ad hoc narrow bandwidth (h = 0.4) as the baseline, which
generates a sample that includes 665 observations (24% of the full sample).11 The standard
deviation of the binding distance is 1.45 (see Table 1); thus, one unit of binding distance
is equivalent to 0.69 of a standard deviation. Therefore, the h = 0.4 bandwidth is roughly
equivalent to 0.28 of a standard deviation.
The standard regression discontinuity design implies that observations around the threshold
are (as good as) random. Thus, if the bandwidth is sufficiently narrow, we should expect an
almost equally balanced sample size on each side of the threshold. Table IA.4 in the Internet
Appendix shows that the samples on each side of the threshold for the baseline bandwidth
(h = 0.4) are not balanced. The split between vit = 0 and vit = 1 is approximately 68% and
32%, respectively. One possible reason that observations cluster on one side of the threshold
is the choice of an insufficiently narrow bandwidth. Table IA.4 also shows that the samples
become more balanced as we narrow the bandwidth. In particular, with h = 0.2 (approximately
14% of a standard deviation) the split is 54%-46%, which appears fairly random. This suggests
that our choice of bandwidth is the likely cause of the sample imbalance. The trade-off we
face is that narrower bandwidths improve sample balance but reduce sample size. Because one
might be instinctively skeptical of estimates from subsamples containing only 10% or less of the
full sample, we choose to focus on the relative large sample defined by h = 0.4 and check the
robustness of the results to larger and smaller bandwidth choices.
Another possible reason for sample imbalance is manipulation: Firms may manipulate earn-
ings to avoid breaching the threshold. Although sample balance does not appear to be an issue
for sufficiently low h’s, we cannot a priori rule out manipulation or other similar sample se-
lection concerns, such as survivorship bias.12 We thus use the panel structure of our data to
mitigate concerns about the non-random nature of the subsamples to the right and to the left
of the threshold. By including firm fixed effects, we ensure that our results are driven by firms
11We drop observations from firms that appear in this sample in only one year; the reported number of
observations thus includes only observations that are not fully explained by firm fixed effects.
12Chava and Roberts (2008) provide various arguments and tests suggesting that accounting manipulation to
avoid covenant violations is both unlikely and difficult to implement (see also Roberts and Whited (2013)).
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that are on both sides of the threshold, which is particularly useful for addressing survivorship
bias. This comes at the cost of some loss of external validity; that is, our results are valid only
for those firms that can be observed both in state vit = 0 and in state vis = 1, where s 6= t.
This may be a non-random sample of firms.
The combination of fixed effects and the use of observations near the threshold mitigates
concerns about omitted variables. With fixed effects, our key identification assumption is that
the expectation of an imminent increase in board independence does not make firms less likely
to manipulate earnings to avoid covenant violations. Although we cannot test this assumption,
it is plausible. However, as is the case with any identification assumption, it may be invalid.13
2.3 Discontinuity Sample: Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents average values for each variable on each side of the threshold for the discon-
tinuity sample with the baseline bandwidth (h = 0.4). We find that narrow violators have
significantly higher leverage than narrow non-violators. This is a mechanical result; leverage
directly affects the variable that defines a violation. There are no statistically significant dif-
ferences in the other firm characteristics. In particular, board characteristics – past, current,
and future – are similar on both sides of the threshold.
Table IA.5 in the Internet Appendix reports the same comparison for the complement of
the discontinuity sample. There are many economically and statistically significant differences,
including firm size, leverage, number of segments, market-to-book, volatility, free cash flow,
return on assets, and CEO tenure.
Panel A of Table IA.6 in the Internet Appendix presents summary statistics for the dis-
continuity sample (h = 0.4). Compared to the full sample statistics in Table 1, firms in the
the discontinuity sample are smaller (average value of assets $2.7 billion) and more levered
(31%). They are also more likely to violate covenants (32%). These differences are unsurpris-
ing; by definition, the discontinuity sample contains only observations that are close to the
violation threshold. All other variables in Table IA.6 appear similar to those in the full sample.
13Note that our approach does not require manipulation to be nonexistent or random. Our analysis remains
valid if manipulation is related to time-invariant firm characteristics or to changing characteristics included in
our regressions.
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Figure 1 illustrates our main finding using the raw data. This figure plots the evolution of the
ratio of independent to non-independent directors (annual cross-sectional averages) in the four
years before and after an implied covenant violation. The figure shows a clear increase in board
independence in the years following a violation. Figure 1 makes it clear that we do not need
sophisticated econometrics to uncover our main finding.
Panel A of Figure 2 plots estimates of nonparametric regressions of the number of inde-
pendent directors on (the negative of) the binding distance. To facilitate the visualization, we
reverse the convention in definition (1), such that—in the figures only—negative values on the
x-axis represent a non-violation and positive values represent a violation. The figure shows
only observations in the interval [−0.4, 0.4]. We run separate regressions for each side of the
threshold. To be consistent with the regression model in (3), we measure the dependent variable
at year t + 2. The thick lines are fitted regression lines, and the thin lines are 95% confidence
intervals. The regression uses an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.05.
Figure 2 shows a clear discontinuity at the threshold. The average number of independent
directors increases by approximately 0.8 after a violation. Figure 2 also shows that the number
of independent directors declines as the firm approaches a violation threshold, jumps upward at
the threshold, and then resumes its decline thereafter. Although we have no reason to predict
such a pattern, we note that the relationship between the number of independent directors and
the binding distance appears similar on both sides of the threshold.
The nonparametric results show clear evidence of an increase in the number of independent
directors following a violation, but these results are subject to some concerns. One specific
concern is that a small number of firms that experience multiple violations could explain the
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estimated effects. To address this concern, we define a first violation indicator as
v′it = {1 if vit = 1; 0 if vis = 0 for all s < t; missing otherwise} . (4)
That is, v′it considers only the first violation event experienced by firm i. After such an event,
we assume that the firm never returns to a non-violation state. Panel B of Figure 2 replicates
Panel A using the first violation indicator. We find that, if anything, the discontinuity appears
more pronounced in this sample; the implied effect is approximately 1.2 directors.
Finally, Figure IA.1 in the Internet Appendix plots estimates of the effect of violations on
the number of non-independent directors. Covenant violations appear to reduce the average
number of non-independent directors, but the effect is statistically less precise (in addition to
being economically less important) than that for the number of independent directors. This is
indeed confirmed by the parametric analysis below.
3.2 Primary Results
Table 3 reports our primary results. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number
of independent directors. Column (1) of Panel A reports the estimate of β from a (local)
regression that includes firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a second-order polynomial
of the binding distance on each side of the discontinuity. The estimated β is positive and
statistically significant. An implied covenant violation leads to an increase of 24% in the
number of independent directors. This implies an increase of 0.24 × 6.4 = 1.5 independent
directors, evaluated at the (full) sample average of the number of independent directors.14 This
effect is approximately twice the effect in Figure 2, which suggests that the inclusion of firm
and year fixed effects amplifies the effect of violations on board independence. The estimated
effect is also economically important and much larger than those documented in most of the
empirical literature on boards (see the discussion in Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011)).15
14As expected, this result is driven primarily by firms with lower board independence. For firms with a below-
median number of independent directors, the estimated β is 0.33 (t = 2.96), while for those with above-median
independence, the estimated β is 0.07 and statistically insignificant.
15In virtually all regressions of board independence on firm characteristics in the literature, the economic
significance of the estimated effects is low. For example, Boone, Casares Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007)
report that a one-standard-deviation increase in firm size is associated with a 1.79-percentage-point increase in
17
The specification in column (2) includes a long list of control variables: operating perfor-
mance (return on assets), growth opportunities (market-to-book), firm size (assets), leverage,
firm age, number of business segments, R&D-to-assets ratio, stock return volatility, free cash
flow, governance index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)), and CEO ownership and tenure.
All of these variables are lagged by two years. To save space, we do not report the coefficients
of the control variables.16 We find that neither market-to-book nor return on assets appears to
be negatively related to board appointments. Although return on assets enters negatively, its
coefficient is neither economically meaningful (−0.78) nor statistically significant (t = −1.16).
A one-standard-deviation decrease in return on assets (−0.08) implies a less than 1% increase
in the number of independent directors. Surprisingly, market-to-book enters positively, but it is
statistically insignificant (t = 1.55) and economically small: For the average firm, a 60% increase
in market-to-book (equivalent to one standard deviation) leads to an 8% increase in the number
of independent directors. Among the control variables, only (log) firm age (0.19, t = 1.96) and
(log) number of segments (0.11, t = 2.27) display statistically significant coefficients.
The most important conclusion from column (2) is that the estimated β is virtually iden-
tical to that in column (1), which suggests that omitted variables are unlikely to explain our
results. While these firm characteristics may be jointly determined with the expectation of fu-
ture changes in board composition, it is reassuring that the inclusion of these variables does not
seem to affect the estimates in an economically meaningful way. We confirm the irrelevance of
these firm characteristics by replicating the regression in column (1) using firm characteristics
as dependent variables. These are “balancing tests,” as in Falato and Liang (2016). Table IA.8
in the Internet Appendix reports a summary of these results. We find that implied covenant
violations do not appear to have an economically or statistically significant (contemporaneous)
effect on any of the firm characteristics used in our analysis. This indicates that violations can-
not explain contemporaneous differences in firm characteristics, after controlling for the binding
distance and firm and year fixed effects. Violations may still affect the future value of some of
these variables, as the related literature reports and as we also show later.
the fraction of independent directors, which corresponds to an approximately one-tenth increase in the number
of independent directors. The economic effect of other important determinants of board independence (e.g.,
firm age, number of business segments, CEO tenure and ownership) is similar.
16Table IA.7 in the Internet Appendix reports the coefficients of the control variables.
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As an alternative means of controlling for time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity, in
columns (3) and (4), we estimate our model using first differences. We find that the estimated
β is larger at 0.30 and 0.27. Finally, for comparison, we also estimate the same regressions
without firm fixed effects, including industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects. In columns (5) and
(6), the estimated β is 0.32 and 0.23, respectively. Thus, firm fixed effects do not appear to
affect the estimates significantly, especially after the introduction of firm-level controls.
Panel B shows results using two alternative definitions of the covenant violation dummy.
The first definition is the first violation indicator, as defined in equation (4). This variable
considers only the first (implied) violation episode for each firm (i.e., we assume that the firm
never returns to a non-violation state). Using this variable addresses the concern that changes
from vit−1 = 0 to vit = 1 may not be symmetric to changes from vit−1 = 1 to vit = 0; while
the former leads to a covenant violation, the latter does not (necessarily) reverse an earlier
violation.
The second definition follows Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012). We define a new violation as a
violation event that follows a non-violation event. That is, we drop all firm-year observations
such that vit = 1 and vit−1 6= 0. Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) argue that new violations “repre-
sent the first opportunity for creditor intervention and thus provide the cleanest identification
of the effect of violations on corporate behavior” (p. 1724).
In columns (1)-(3), which use the first violation indicator, the estimated β rises to 0.34, that
is, a substantially higher marginal effect of 2.2 new directors (evaluated at the sample mean).
This estimate is also remarkably stable across methods. In columns (4)-(6), which use the new
violation indicator, the estimated β ranges from 0.25 (fixed effects) to 0.38 (OLS). We conclude
that our results are not driven by multiple or “stale” violations.
Table 4 replicates the regression analysis above using the logarithm of the number of non-
independent directors as the dependent variable. The estimates show that violations also in-
crease board independence by reducing the number of non-independent directors on boards of
directors. However, this effect is statistically and economically weak. In addition, the esti-
mated β is not robust across different specifications and definitions. Comparing Table 3 with
Table 4 reveals that the number of new appointments is two to three times larger than the
number of insider departures. Thus, the new outside directors are typically not replacements
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for resignations by insiders; board size increases after violations.
Overall, we find robust evidence of an economically important effect of implied covenant
violations on board independence. The appointment of new directors following violations ex-
plains most of this effect. By contrast, there is no evidence of a similar increase in the number
of non-independent directors. Thus, board independence unambiguously increases following
violations. The joint evidence from Tables 3 and 4 shows that newly appointed directors are
not replacements for departing directors.
3.3 Polynomial Order and Bandwidth Choice
There is no generally accepted criterion for choosing the polynomial order in regression disconti-
nuity designs. Although the use of high-order polynomials is common in the literature, Gelman
and Imbens (2014) advise against using polynomials of order higher than 2. Polynomials of or-
der 2 have additional attractive properties. Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) show that,
under certain conditions, one can adjust for the bias of a local-linear estimator by constructing
confidence intervals based on the local-quadratic estimator. Although these are compelling
reasons to choose a second-order polynomial as the baseline, we also experiment with different
polynomial orders and bandwidth choices, as recommended by Roberts and Whited (2013).
Table 5 reports the estimates of β for a combination of six different bandwidths (h = 0.3 to
0.5 and the full sample) and polynomial orders (1 to 5), using the logarithm of the number of
independent directors as the outcome variable. We do not include other firm-level characteristics
as controls, but the results are similar when we include them.
Consider first the choice of polynomial order. For the baseline bandwidth (h = 0.4) and with
a polynomial of order 1 (i.e., a local-linear regression), the estimated β is 0.07 and statistically
insignificant. With our preferred specification (order 2), the estimate is 0.24. For polynomials
of order 3 or higher, the estimated β ranges between 0.20 and 0.30. Choosing the narrowest
bandwidth (h = 0.3) reduces the number of observations by almost half. The point estimate of
β is approximately the same (0.22) as that for the baseline bandwidth. Although the confidence
intervals are wider, which is expected because of the smaller sample size, all estimated effects
are statistically significant. Larger bandwidths (h = 0.45 or h = 0.5) lead to slightly lower
point estimates of β for polynomials of orders 1 and 2, but polynomial order has little impact
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on β for orders of 3 or higher. We conclude that the effect of violations on the number of
independent directors is robust to polynomial order and bandwidth choice.
An alternative to local regressions is global regressions with high-order polynomials. While
this approach is considered inferior to local regressions by some authors (e.g., Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) and Gelman and Imbens (2014)), for completeness, we report (in column
(6)) the estimates from global regressions. The global regression results are consistent with
the hypothesis that board independence increases after covenant violations, but such results
underscore the limitations of this approach. Global regressions require high-order polynomials,
unless there are a priori reasons to assume that the relationship between the outcome variable
and the running variable is smooth. However, high-order polynomials create a number of issues
(Gelman and Imbens (2014)). One issue is that estimates are often sensitive to the polynomial
order. We find that, for lower-order polynomials (orders 1 to 4), the estimated β is positive but
small and only statistically significant for order 1. For polynomials of order equal to or higher
than 5 (untabulated), the estimated β is always statistically significant, although generally
lower than that estimated with local regressions.
3.4 Discontinuity-based Exogeneity Tests
Firm fixed effects address the problem of time-invariant omitted variables, and the large number
of firm controls further mitigates concerns about time-varying omitted variables. Nevertheless,
we cannot completely exclude the possibility that time-varying omitted variables explain the
relationship between covenant violations and board independence. For example, there could be
firm-specific trends or cycles that appear to coincide with violation events.
Under mild assumptions, we can formally test for omitted variables by means of a series of
placebo tests. Following Caetano (2015), we interpret our tests as discontinuity-based exogene-
ity tests. Consider the following model:
ln yit = βdv
d








+ αt + fi + uit, (5)
vdit−2 =
 1 if Dit−2 ≤ d0 if Dit−2 > d . (6)
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That is, if d = 0, v0it−2 equals the real threshold indicator, vit−2. All other d 6= 0 define “fake”
or “placebo” thresholds. Formally, we perform a series of tests for the null H0 : βd = 0 against
the alternative H1 : βd 6= 0, for a set of d ∈ [−h, h] . That is, we run the same regressions as
before, after replacing the true threshold vit−2 with a fake threshold vdit−2, d 6= 0.
Under the assumption that the true relationship between yit and Dit−2 is continuous (plus
a few additional regularity assumptions; see Caetano (2015)), a rejection of the null βd = 0
implies that Dit−2 is not (locally) exogenous at d; this rejection indicates that there exists at
least one omitted variable that creates a discontinuity at point Dit−2 = d.17
To implement these tests, we first create eight different fake thresholds that are equally
distant from one another. These placebo thresholds lie in the interval defined by d ∈ [−0.4, 0.4],
which includes the real threshold. Each d is 0.1 units away from an adjacent threshold. To
facilitate comparison with our previous results, we implement such tests using the analog of
equation (3) instead of equation (5): For each placebo threshold, we redefine the binding
distance variable such that it becomes centered at the new threshold. We then redefine the
discontinuity sample accordingly and estimate the number of independent directors regression
in column (1) of Table 3 for each placebo threshold.
Table 6 shows the results. For all values of d 6= 0, we cannot reject the null that βd = 0 at
the 5% significance level (the null is rejected at 10% only for d = 0.3, but the estimated effect is
negative and economically small at −0.06). Furthermore, most estimates are economically close
to zero, with magnitudes in the range [−0.06, 0.11], and display changes in sign that follow no
particular pattern. By contrast, the estimated effect at the true threshold is statistically and
economically strong at β0 = 0.24.
We believe that these placebo tests provide the strongest evidence in favor of a causal
interpretation of our findings. In the presence of fixed effects, the main source of endogeneity
is (time-varying) omitted variables. Our placebo tests fail to detect such omitted variables at
values of the forcing variable that differ from the true covenant violation threshold.
17Our placebo test can be interpreted as a parametric version of Caetano (2015) exogeneity tests without
instruments. She shows that such tests only have nontrivial power for alternatives in which an omitted variable
creates a discontinuity in the distribution of unobservables. The test is not meant to rule out omitted variables
(exogeneity is the null) but rather to detect cases in which omitted variables are likely.
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3.5 Possible Mismeasurement of Covenant Violations
Are the estimates sensitive to our measure of covenant violations? We address this question
by considering a different definition of covenant violations: violations that are registered with
the SEC, as in Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012). Henceforth, we
refer to this variable as registered violations. The registered violation variable is constructed
using information from the SEC’s 10-Q and 10-K filings.18 Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) use
an algorithm to identify financial covenant violations in credit agreements for publicly traded
firms. They construct an indicator variable of whether the firm reports a violation of a financial
covenant during each quarter.
A limitation of the registered violation measure is that we do not know which covenant
is responsible for a reported violation. Therefore, to measure the binding distance, we need
to infer from accounting data which covenant has been violated. This procedure reduces the
sample size and may create other forms of measurement errors. We thus consider four different
ways of using registered violations.
First, we use registered violations to eliminate “false negatives,” which we define as cases
in which we observe a registered violation but not an implied violation. We drop all firm-year
observations for which (1) there is no implied violation but there is a registered violation in
one of the previous four quarters or (2) we do not have data on registered violations. This
procedure eliminates 75 observations from the discontinuity sample, or 11% of that sample. We
expect this correction to improve measurement quality because a false negative is hard evidence
of mismeasurement. Table 7 reports the results in columns (1) (without firm-level controls) and
(2) (with firm-level controls). We find that correcting for false negatives has no effect on the
estimates: The number of independent directors increases by 24% after a covenant violation.19
Second, we use registered violations to eliminate “false positives,” which are cases in which
we have an implied violation but find no registered violation in the current or following year.
Eliminating false positives is a more controversial procedure than eliminating false negatives.
False positives will often occur when a violation is waived or renegotiated before the need
18The data are available at Amir Sufi’s website at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/amir.sufi/data.html.
19Table IA.9 in the Internet Appendix shows that estimates are close to zero when we estimate the placebo
tests in Table 6 using this sample of registered violations.
23
to report it. Thus, false positives could indicate a less serious violation but one that could
nonetheless affect board composition. Dropping all false positives eliminates 257 observations
from the discontinuity sample, or 39% of that sample. False positives are quite frequent; just
over 80% of all implied violations are not registered. This suggests that renegotiation and the
waiving of covenants are frequent occurrences (Roberts (2015) and Denis and Wang (2014)).
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 report the results using only registered violations (i.e.,
after correcting for false positives). We find that using only registered violations significantly
increases the estimated β: The number of independent directors increases by 49% after a
violation. Due to a significant reduction in sample size, this effect is less precisely estimated,
but it is still statistically significant at the 10% level. A larger effect when using only registered
violations is somewhat expected; registered violations are likely to be the most serious violations
and thus more likely to have consequences for borrowers.
Third, we simultaneously correct for both false negatives and false positives . This eliminates
293 observations from the discontinuity sample, or 44% of that sample. Columns (5) and (6)
report the results. The estimated β is 0.5 and statistically significant at the 10% level.
Finally, we can also simply replace the implied violation measure with the registered vi-
olation measure, without attempting to infer which covenant is associated with an observed
registered violation. Under this approach, we cannot calculate the binding distance, and thus,
we also cannot define the discontinuity sample. The best we can do here is to work with the
full sample and control for accounting variables that may be used in credit agreements.
We report the full sample analysis in the Internet Appendix. The sample that results from
merging the registered violation data with the IRRC data yields 1,296 firms and 8,514 firm-
year observations. Table IA.10 in the Internet Appendix presents descriptive statistics of the
variables in our study using this sample. Figure IA.2 in the Internet Appendix replicates Figure
1 with this alternative sample. We find that the evolution of the ratio of independent to non-
independent directors around a covenant violation is similar to that in Figure 1. In fact, the two
figures are noticeably similar, clearly showing that the ratio of independent to non-independent
directors increases following a violation.
Next, following Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012), we estimate a
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“quasi-discontinuity” specification:
ln yit = βvit−2 + δh (xit−2) + αt + fi + εit, (7)
where h (xit−2) denotes a vector of functions of control variables, including those variables
on which covenants are written. We include third-order polynomials and quintile indicator
variables for each of the following five variables: leverage, return on assets, interest expense-
to-assets ratio, net worth-to-assets ratio, and cash-to-assets ratio. Table IA.11 in the Internet
Appendix reports the estimates of equation (7). All specifications produce similar estimates.
The semi-elasticity of the number of independent directors to covenant violations is approxi-
mately 4%. The size of the effects, especially compared to those in the discontinuity samples
when we use registered violations only, suggests that controlling for the distance to a violation
substantially increases the estimates. When we use the number of non-independent directors
as the dependent variable, we find a negative effect of covenant violations, but as before, the
effect is statistically insignificant.
We conclude that the effect of covenant violations on board independence does not depend
on our particular measure of covenant violations. We also find that, when using registered
violations in the discontinuity sample, the estimated effects are economically stronger (but
statistically weaker) than those obtained with implied violations, indicating that more serious
violations have stronger consequences for board composition.
3.6 Robustness
Table IA.12 in the Internet Appendix reports the results of several robustness tests: (1) Poisson
regressions; (2) regressions that exclude CEO turnover events; (3) excluding debt-to-EBITDA
covenants; (4) adding interest coverage covenants; (5) splitting the sample into two periods,
before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX); (6) extending the sample to include observa-
tions after 2008, up to 2014; and (7) using the ratio of independent directors to board size as
the outcome variable. Tables IA.13 to IA.20 in the Internet Appendix report additional robust-
ness checks such as using different lag structures, controlling for past stock returns, and using
different criteria to determine which observations are retained in the discontinuity sample.
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4 Mechanisms and Consequences
4.1 Who are the directors appointed after covenant violations?
We use directors’ employment information to investigate whether there may be (indirect) links
to banks. We consider a director to be connected to a bank if the director holds a position (board
or non-board) in a firm that borrows from the same bank. To measure these connections, we
consider links via banks (lead arrangers or other participants) in outstanding syndicated loans.
In the full sample, we find that 53% of all directors are connected to current banks. Of these
connections, 88% happen through lead arrangers.
We estimate the regression in equation (3) using as the outcome variable either the logarithm
of one plus the number of connected independent directors or the logarithm of one plus the
number of unconnected independent directors. Table 8 shows the results. Column (1) shows
our preferred specification (the analog of column (1) in Table 3 with firm and year fixed effects
and no control variables). An implied covenant violation increases the number of connected
independent directors by 18%. Columns (2) and (3) show that our findings are robust to
different specifications. By contrast, columns (4)-(6) show that unconnected directors explain
a negligible fraction of the effect of violations on board appointments; the effect is economically
small (5%) and statistically insignificant.20
The results in Table 8 show that violations explain the increase in the number of directors
with indirect links to current banks. Given that about half of all directors have such indi-
rect links, this finding is perhaps unsurprising. A relevant question is thus whether directors
appointed outside violation events also have such connections. In other words, are directors
appointed following violations more likely to have indirect links to banks than those appointed
outside violation events?
To answer this question, we collect additional data on all newly appointed independent
directors within two years after a firm first violates a covenant (i.e., the first time that we
observe a change from vit−1 = 0 to vit = 1). We identify 226 directors for which current and
20Table IA.21 in the Internet Appendix shows estimates of the regressions in Table 8, columns (1)-(3), for the
number of connected independent directors through lead arrangers and other participants in the loan syndicate.
We find that the results are economically stronger (in terms of marginal effects) when we measure connections
through lead arrangers than through other participants.
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past employment data (in publicly listed firms) are available from the BoardEx database.
To create the control group, we match each new director to a randomly chosen independent
director who joined the board in a non-violation year (to maximize the number of matches,
we consider the two years before the first violation). With this matching criterion, we match
only 129 directors. Of these 129 new directors, 109 work for firms for which we are able to
obtain syndicated loan data. Table 9 presents sample averages of the characteristics of new
directors and directors in the control group. We find that newly appointed directors are not
substantially different from directors in the control group in most characteristics. The main
exception is the bank connection variable. We find that 75% of the directors appointed after
implied violations have connections to their firms’ current banks, while only 40% of the control
group have connections to current banks. The difference between the two groups – 35% – is
statistically significant, with a t-statistic of 5.93.21
We also construct a variation of the bank connection variable, in which we consider only
connections through banks in the syndicate of the loan contract for which a violation occurs.
We find that 69% of the new directors are connected to the banks of a syndicated loan with
a recent covenant violation (i.e., 92% of all connections occur via banks of the loan contract
that triggered the violation). In the control group, however, only 31% of the directors have
connections to the banks in the syndicate of the loan for which a violation occurs. The difference
is 38%, with a t-statistic of 6.84.
In sum, we find that implied covenant violations increase the number of directors with links
to the firm’s current banks, and that directors appointed after violations are significantly more
likely to have connections to banks than directors appointed outside these events. These results
indicate that those with power to influence director nominations believe that, following viola-
tions, connected directors are particularly beneficial to their interests. However, the evidence
cannot tell us who the main beneficiaries are: creditors, managers or shareholders.
4.2 What happens after new directors are appointed?
In this section, we examine what happens when new directors are appointed following violations.
We identify all first violations in the h = 0.4 subsample, and create a subsample of firms that
21Table IA.22 in the Internet Appendix reports the results using two alternative control groups.
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experience a first violation. In this subsample, we create a new appointment dummy that takes
a value of one if there is an increase in the number of independent directors between year 0
(when a violation occurs) and year 2 (two years after a violation). We consider years -3, -2,
and -1 as the period before the violation and years 2, 3, and 4 as the period after the violation.
We estimate the following regression:
yit = ηait + βniait + αt + fi + δxit + εit, (8)
where yit is a firm outcome; ait is the after dummy that takes a value of one for years 2 to 4
after firm i experiences a first violation; ni is the new appointment dummy; αt is a year fixed
effect; fi is a firm fixed effect; and xit is a measure of firm size (the logarithm of assets).
22 Note
that the new appointment dummy for the period before the violation is absorbed by the firm
fixed effects, and the after indicator is defined in event-time and thus not absorbed by the year
fixed effect. The interpretation of coefficient β is similar to that of a difference-in-differences
estimator, except that the “treatment” here—an increase in board independence—is certainly
endogenous, which means that the estimated β should not be interpreted as a causal effect.
Table 10 shows the results. Panel A studies investment, financial and payout policies after
covenant violations. Column (1) shows that investment—measured by capital expenditures
scaled by lagged property, plant and equipment—decreases in years 2 to 4 after a violation. This
result is similar to that in Chava and Roberts (2008), but the horizon is different: While Chava
and Roberts (2008) estimate the effects one quarter ahead of a violation, our results suggest
that investment rates remain low for a number of years after a violation. The −0.07 coefficient
on the after dummy variable implies that, for firms that do not appoint new directors in the
post-violation years, the annual investment rate is 7% (of capital) lower than that in the pre-
violation years. For firms that appoint new directors, there are no economically or statistically
significant differences in investment rates before and after the violation; the estimated effect is
−0.07 + 0.08 = 0.01, which is not statistically significant.
Column (2) shows the estimate for net debt issues scaled by lagged assets. The estimate
is qualitatively similar to that in Roberts and Sufi (2009), but our results are for a longer
22We keep the model parsimonious because we have a small sample.
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horizon. We find that debt issuance decreases less in firms that appoint new directors, but the
difference between the two groups is not statistically significant. Column (3) shows that net
equity issues (scaled by lagged assets) increase in years 2 to 4 after a violation. This increase is
more pronounced in firms that appoint new independent directors: Annual net equity issuance
is 4% higher in firms that appoint new directors after a violation than in firms with no such
appointments; the difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. Column (4) measures
the effect of violations on equity issuance using SEO proceeds (scaled by lagged assets). We find
a significant increase in SEO activity in firms that appoint new directors following violations.
Column (5) measures the effect on payout using Dividends (scaled by lagged assets). We find
a significant decrease in dividends in firms that appoint new directors following violations.
Column (6) shows that operational risk—measured by the annualized standard deviation of
return on assets (ROA) over the last eight quarters (volatility of ROA)—significantly decreases
in firms that appoint new directors following violations.23
In sum, although the evidence here is only suggestive, it indicates more intense equity
issuance and investment activity, and dividend cuts in firms that appoint new directors after
covenant violations than in firms with no such appointments. In addition, the newly appointed
directors appear to take actions that reduce operational risk. While some of these policies
are likely to benefit both creditors and shareholders, we note that the dividend cuts and risk
reductions are more likely to benefit creditors (see Becker and Stromberg (2012) for similar
arguments).
Panel B studies CEO compensation after covenant violations. Columns (1) and (2) show
that both total pay and salary do not seem to change significantly after violations. Column (3)
shows that cash bonuses (bonus) increase in the years after a violation for firms that do not
appoint new independent directors, while cash bonuses actually decrease for firms that appoint
new directors. By contrast, column (4) shows that the value of option grants decreases after a
violation, but this decrease is much less pronounced in firms that appoint new directors.
Overall, the evidence suggests a narrative in which CEO compensation is tilted toward cash
bonuses—and away from options and stock—in firms that do not appoint new directors. By
23Table IA.23 in the Internet Appendix presents estimates of a variation of equation (8) in which we collapse
the data into two periods: before and after covenant violation. We obtain estimates similar to those in Table
10.
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contrast, firms with newly appointed directors experience a decrease in cash bonuses and a
much smaller decline in options grants. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that
reformed boards following violations are more likely to favor equity-based compensation over
cash-based compensation.
The fact that covenant violations have long-lasting effects may appear puzzling since new
appointments occur with a lag. However, most lending relationships between banks and firms
involve multiple interactions over a long period of time, and thus banks may care about long-
lasting effects. Consistent with this reasoning, Table IA.24 in the Internet Appendix shows
that the effect of violations on board appointments is stronger in firm-bank pairs with repeated
relationships. In addition, the effect of violations on board appointments is more pronounced
in firms with stronger lending relationships, firms that are more dependent on bank loans, and
firms with less tight covenants at loan origination.
5 Conclusion
We show that credit agreements have consequences for the composition of boards of directors.
We find that covenant violations lead to the appointment of new independent directors. As
a consequence, board size increases. A large number of these newly appointed directors have
connections to creditors; these connected directors explain most of the estimated effects.
Our results also show that current and past credit agreements can have long-lasting effects
on a firm’s governance. In the years after a covenant violation, firms with newly appointed inde-
pendent directors issue more equity, invest more, pay less dividends, and have less operational
risk than those firms that do not reform their boards. This is consistent with firms taking ac-
tions to mitigate debt overhang and risk-shifting problems. Firms with new board appointments
also have a different CEO compensation structure in the years following a violation: They are
more likely to favor equity-based compensation over cash-based compensation. Since boards
are responsible for approving investments, equity issuances, dividends, and CEO compensation,
these changes in firm policies are consistent with the hypothesis that more independent boards
actively favor policies that are beneficial (not only) to creditors in the post-violation period.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table presents mean, standard deviation, minimum, 10th percentile, median, 90th percentile, maximum, number of observations, and number of firms for
each variable. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated
loans data are available from DealScan. Financial industries are omitted (SIC codes 6000-6999). Board and governance data are from the IRRC database.
Executive compensation data are from ExecuComp. Accounting and segment data are from Compustat. Stock return data are from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP). Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current
ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. Binding distance is the relative distance between the
actual accounting variable and the corresponding covenant threshold. Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Financial ratios are















Number of independent directors 6.39 2.11 1.00 4.00 6.00 9.00 15.00 2,801 597
Number of non-independent directors 2.76 1.65 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 13.00 2,801 597
Ratio of indep. to non-indep. directors 3.45 2.58 0.10 1.00 2.67 8.00 13.00 2,801 597
Number of directors 9.15 2.13 4.00 7.00 9.00 12.00 19.00 2,801 597
Number of connected directors 3.14 2.20 0.00 0.00 3.00 6.00 11.00 2,663 571
Number of non-connected directors 2.80 1.75 0.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 10.00 2,663 571
Firm size ($ millions) 3,542 11,324 43 368 1,231 7,144 270,634 2,801 597
Leverage 0.25 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.25 0.45 0.87 2,801 597
Firm age 22.56 17.42 1.00 6.00 17.00 42.00 81.00 2,801 597
Number of segments 2.88 1.91 1.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 10.00 2,801 597
Market-to-book 1.88 1.15 0.62 1.04 1.54 3.00 8.89 2,801 597
R&D 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.37 2,801 597
Stock return volatility 0.38 0.20 0.12 0.19 0.34 0.63 1.74 2,801 597
Free cash flow 0.09 0.08 -0.79 0.01 0.09 0.18 0.36 2,801 597
Return on assets 0.15 0.08 -0.66 0.07 0.14 0.25 0.44 2,801 597
Governance index 9.33 2.63 3.00 6.00 9.00 13.00 17.00 2,801 597
CEO ownership 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.30 2,801 597
CEO tenure 7.51 7.51 0.00 1.00 5.00 17.00 49.00 2,801 597
Covenant violation 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2,801 597
Binding distance 0.07 1.45 -7.36 -0.63 0.30 0.92 4.14 2,801 597
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Table 2: Averages for Violation and Non-Violation Groups - Sample
within Bandwidth
This table presents sample averages of board composition and firm characteristics for observations with no
covenant violation and observations with at least one covenant violation. A covenant violation occurs if the firm
violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA)
during the year in at least one quarter. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available
from DealScan. The sample includes observations in which the absolute value of the relative binding distance
to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4).
No violation Violation Difference t-statistic
(1) (2) (1)-(2)
Number of independent directors (2 leads) 6.34 6.41 -0.08 -0.40
Number of independent directors (2 lags) 5.98 5.94 0.04 0.18
Number of independent directors (1 lag) 5.99 5.89 0.10 0.47
Number of independent directors 5.97 6.03 -0.06 -0.31
Number of non-independent directors (2 leads) 2.94 2.95 -0.01 -0.07
Number of non-independent directors (2 lags) 3.36 3.59 -0.23 -1.30
Number of non-independent directors (1 lag) 3.32 3.53 -0.22 -1.31
Number of non-independent directors 3.22 3.39 -0.17 -1.05
Firm size ($ millions) 2,553 3,051 -498 -1.28
Leverage 0.29 0.35 -0.06 -5.03
Firm age 23.98 21.95 2.03 1.38
Number of segments 2.96 3.03 -0.06 -0.38
Market-to-book 1.47 1.48 -0.01 -0.24
R&D 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.11
Stock return volatility 0.37 0.38 -0.01 -0.95
Free cash flow 0.07 0.07 0.00 1.02
Return on assets 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.54
Governance index 9.45 9.33 0.12 0.57
CEO ownership 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.55
CEO tenure 8.24 7.30 0.94 1.54
Number of observations 454 211
Number of firms 192 121
Fraction of observations in violation 0.32
Fraction of firms in violation 0.55
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Table 3: Regression of Number of Independent Directors
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects, first differences and ordinary least squares (OLS) panel
regressions of the logarithm of the number of independent directors. Covenant violation is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible
net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. The firm-level control variables are firm
size (log), leverage, firm age (log), number of segments (log), market-to-book (log), R&D, stock return volatility,
free cash flow, return on assets, governance index, CEO ownership, and CEO tenure. All explanatory variables
are lagged two years. Panel A presents estimates using all covenant violations, and Panel B presents estimates
using the first covenant violation or new violations for each firm. The sample consists of annual observations
on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated
loans data are available from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute
value of the relative binding distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to
Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A: All Violations
Firm fixed effects First differences OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.32*** 0.23***
(3.47) (3.66) (3.37) (3.21) (3.30) (2.68)
Marginal effects (at mean) 1.53 1.60 1.92 1.73 2.04 1.47
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.176 0.249 0.137 0.167 0.301 0.497
Number of observations 665 665 472 472 665 665
Number of firms 222 222 214 214 222 222
Panel B: First and New Violations
First violations New violations
Firm FE First diff. OLS Firm FE First diff. OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.25*** 0.35*** 0.38***
(3.20) (2.75) (2.88) (2.68) (3.22) (3.01)
Marginal effects (at mean) 2.17 2.17 2.17 1.60 2.24 2.43
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No No No No
Firm fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.163 0.161 0.378 0.190 0.184 0.317
Number of observations 522 350 522 502 357 502
Number of firms 188 179 188 175 165 175
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Table 4: Regression of Number of Non-Independent Directors
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects, first differences and ordinary least squares (OLS) panel
regressions of the logarithm of the number of non-independent directors. Covenant violation is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net
worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. The firm-level control
variables are firm size (log), leverage, firm age (log), number of segments (log), market-to-book (log), R&D,
stock return volatility, free cash flow, return on assets, governance index, CEO ownership, and CEO tenure. All
explanatory variables are lagged two years. Panel A presents estimates using all covenant violations, and Panel
B presents estimates using the first covenant violation or new violations for each firm. The sample consists of
annual observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008
for which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in
which the absolute value of the relative binding distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth
(h = 0.4). Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level
clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A: All Violations
Firm fixed effects First differences OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation -0.21** -0.21** -0.19 -0.19 -0.13 -0.09
(-2.41) (-2.45) (-1.44) (-1.49) (-0.97) (-0.75)
Marginal effects (at mean) -0.58 -0.58 -0.52 -0.52 -0.36 -0.25
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.245 0.285 0.163 0.176 0.389 0.452
Number of observations 665 665 472 472 665 665
Number of firms 222 222 214 214 222 222
Panel B: First and New Violations
First violations New violations
Firm FE First diff. OLS Firm FE First diff. OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation -0.35*** -0.33** -0.12 -0.40*** -0.19 -0.19
(-2.80) (-2.04) (-0.71) (-3.42) (-1.37) (-1.17)
Marginal effects (at mean) -0.97 -0.91 -0.33 -1.10 -0.52 -0.52
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No No No No No No
Firm fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.247 0.269 0.394 0.310 0.185 0.436
Number of observations 522 350 522 502 357 502
Number of firms 188 179 188 175 165 175
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Table 5: Regression of Number of Independent Directors - Alterna-
tive Polynomial Orders and Bandwidths
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the logarithm of the number of independent
directors. Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one
out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at
least one quarter. All explanatory variables are lagged two years. The sample consists of annual observations
on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated
loans data are available from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute value
of the relative binding distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h). Refer to Table A1 in
the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Polyn. Bandwidth Full
order h = 0.3 h = 0.35 h = 0.4 h = 0.45 h = 0.5 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 1st 0.12* 0.11** 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03**
(1.67) (2.08) (1.57) (1.21) (1.13) (2.15)
Covenant violation 2nd 0.22** 0.19** 0.24*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.02
(2.35) (2.54) (3.47) (2.76) (2.97) (0.96)
Covenant violation 3rd 0.36*** 0.28*** 0.20** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.02
(2.75) (2.87) (2.37) (3.12) (2.94) (1.06)
Covenant violation 4th 0.46*** 0.31** 0.30*** 0.23** 0.23*** 0.04
(2.82) (2.49) (2.82) (2.54) (2.80) (1.36)
Covenant violation 5th 0.41** 0.42*** 0.28** 0.28** 0.21** 0.06*
(2.48) (2.70) (2.16) (2.59) (2.12) (1.76)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.226 0.166 0.152 0.164 0.182 0.191
Number of observations 346 503 665 813 976 2,801
Number of firms 129 176 222 255 292 597
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Table 6: Regression of Number of Independent Directors - Placebo Test
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the logarithm of the number of independent directors. Covenant violation is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA)
during the year in at least one quarter. All explanatory variables are lagged two years. The estimates are shown using different distances to the real
threshold, which is set at zero. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994
to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the relative
binding distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h). Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics
adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Distance to real threshold
−0.4 −0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Covenant violation 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.24*** -0.06 0.01 -0.06* -0.01
(0.55) (1.00) (0.41) (0.33) (3.47) (-1.22) (0.19) (-1.66) (-0.23)
Marginal effects (at mean) 0.70 0.64 0.32 0.19 1.53 -0.38 0.06 -0.38 -0.06
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.213 0.270 0.232 0.147 0.176 0.187 0.194 0.181 0.182
Number of observations 104 151 245 430 665 883 1,068 1,109 1,128
Number of firms 45 64 97 155 222 272 316 321 325
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Table 7: Regression of Number of Independent Directors - SEC-
DealScan Matched Sample
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the logarithm of the number of independent
directors. Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one
out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to EBITDA) during the year in
at least one quarter. The firm-level control variables are firm size (log), leverage, firm age (log), number of
segments (log), market-to-book (log), R&D, stock return volatility, free cash flow, return on assets, governance
index, CEO ownership, and CEO tenure. All explanatory variables are lagged two years. Columns (1) and
(2) drop observations in case the covenant violation dummy is zero but there is a covenant violation according
to the SEC’s 10-Q or 10-K filings. Columns (3) and (4) drop observations in case the covenant violation
dummy is one but there is no covenant violation according to the SEC’s 10-Q or 10-K filings. Columns (5)
and (6) drop observations in both cases. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available
from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the relative binding
distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for
variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.49* 0.49* 0.51* 0.50*
(3.35) (3.64) (1.86) (1.93) (1.72) (1.76)
Marginal effects (at mean) 1.53 1.53 3.13 3.13 3.26 3.19
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.174 0.258 0.253 0.317 0.241 0.323
Number of observations 590 590 408 408 372 372
Number of firms 203 203 146 146 135 135
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Table 8: Regression of Number of Connected and Non-Connected Di-
rectors
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects, first differences and ordinary least squares (OLS) panel
regressions of the logarithm of one plus the number of connected directors or unconnected directors. Connected
directors are those that have a board or non-board position in another firm with outstanding loans that have
at least one bank (lead arranger or other participant) in common with the firm’s current banks. Non-connected
directors include all other cases. Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm
violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to EBITDA)
during the year in at least one quarter. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available
from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the relative binding
distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for
variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Number of connected directors Number of non-connected directors
Firm FE First diff. OLS Firm FE First diff. OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.18** 0.33*** 0.33** 0.05 0.05 0.10
(2.26) (2.74) (2.40) (0.60) (0.39) (0.83)
Marginal effects (at mean) 0.75 1.37 1.37 0.19 0.19 0.38
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.060 0.168 0.281 0.133 0.119 0.257
Number of observations 623 439 623 623 439 623
Number of firms 207 199 207 207 199 207
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Table 9: Characteristics of Independent Directors Appointed after
Covenant Violations
This table reports sample averages of the characteristics of new independent directors appointed in the two
years after a firm first violates a covenant and a matched control group of independent directors. To construct
the control group, a new director is matched to a randomly-chosen independent director in the same firm. The
control group includes independent directors who joined the board in the two years before the first violation.









Male 0.91 0.86 0.05 1.30 129
Age 55.83 54.55 1.28 1.42 129
MBA 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.33 129
Financial education 0.25 0.26 -0.02 -0.31 129
Audit or finance committee 0.55 0.65 -0.10 -1.65 129
Past audit or finance committee 0.46 0.33 0.12 1.99 129
Past financial role 0.21 0.16 0.05 0.95 129
Financial firm connection 0.21 0.12 0.09 1.94 129
Financial firm board member 0.14 0.12 0.02 0.39 129
Number of board positions 1.99 1.83 0.16 0.54 129
Number of past board positions 1.33 1.02 0.32 1.58 129
Bank connection 0.75 0.40 0.35 5.93 109
Bank connection - violation 0.69 0.31 0.38 6.84 109
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Table 10: Regression of Firm Policies
This table presents estimates of regressions of investment, financing, payout, volatility and CEO compensation
around the time of covenant violations. A covenant violation occurs if the firm violates at least one out of four
covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one
quarter. The firm-level control variable is firm size (log). New appointment is a (treatment group) dummy
variable that takes a value of one if there is an increase in the number of independent directors between year 0
(the violation year) and year 2. After is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in the post-violation period.
Panel A presents estimates in which the dependent variable is capital expenditures (scaled by lagged property,
plant and equipment), net debt issues, net equity issues, SEO proceeds, changes in dividends (all scaled by
lagged total assets), and changes in the standard deviation (annualized) of return on assets (ROA) over the
last eight quarters. Panel B presents estimates in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of CEO total
pay, salary, bonus, value of option grants (grant-date Black-Scholes value) or value of restricted stock grants
(grant-date fair value). The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. The
sample includes years -3, -2, and -1 before the violation, and years 2, 3, and 4 after the violation. Refer to
Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A: Investment, Financing, Payout and Volatility
Net debt Net equity SEO Volatility
Investment issues issues proceeds Dividends of ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New appointment × After 0.081 0.028 0.037* 0.035** -0.002** -0.007**
(1.60) (1.09) (1.77) (1.99) (-2.51) (-2.01)
After -0.066* -0.086** 0.034 0.007 0.000 -0.002
(-1.92) (-2.11) (1.26) (0.23) (0.41) (-0.24)
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.132 0.100 0.045 0.056 0.090 0.087
Number of observations 697 697 697 697 678 652
Number of firms 118 118 118 118 118 118
Panel B: CEO Compensation
CEO CEO CEO CEO CEO
Total pay (log) Salary (log) Bonus (log) Option (log) Stock (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
New appointment × After 0.134 -0.041 -0.641*** 0.510** 0.051
(1.28) (-0.82) (-2.62) (2.00) (0.13)
After -0.220 0.065 0.365* -0.774** -0.760**
(-1.33) (0.96) (1.72) (-2.35) (-2.10)
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.218 0.301 0.184 0.136 0.395
Number of observations 660 663 485 413 227
Number of firms 118 118 117 110 80
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Figure 1: Ratio of Independent to Non-Independent Directors
This figure shows the cross-sectional average and 95% confidence interval of the ratio of independent to non-
independent directors in the four years before and after a covenant violation. A covenant violation occurs if
the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-
to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data
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Figure 2: Number of Independent Directors and Binding Distance to
Covenant Threshold
This figure shows nonparametric regression estimates of the number of independent directors (two years after
violation) on the relative binding distance to the covenant threshold. A covenant violation occurs if the firm
violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA)
during the year in at least one quarter. Panel A presents estimates using all covenant violations, and Panel
B presents estimates using only the first covenant violation for each firm. The sample consists of annual
observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for
which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan.
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Table A1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Number of independent directors Number of board members that are independent directors (IRRC).
Number of non-independent directors Number of board members that are non-independent directors (IRRC).
Number of directors Number of board members (IRRC).
Number of connected directors Number of board members that have a board or non-board position in another firm with outstand-
ing loans that have at least one bank (lead arranger or other participant) in common with the
firm’s current banks (BoardEx).
Number of non-connected directors Number of board members that do not have a board or non-board position in another firm with
outstanding loans that have at least one bank (lead arranger or other participant) in common with
the firm’s current banks (BoardEx).
Covenant violation Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenant
(current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one
quarter, and zero otherwise (DealScan).
Current ratio Ratio of current assets to current liabilities in each quarter (Compustat ACTQ / LCTQ).
Net worth Total assets minus total liabilities in each quarter in $ millions (Compustat ATQ − LTQ).
Tangible net worth Tangible assets minus total liabilities in each quarter in $ millions (Computstat ACTQ + AOQ +
PPENTQ − LTQ).
Debt-to-EBITDA Ratio of total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) to earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization (sum of four most recent fiscal quarters) (Compustat (DLTTQ +
DLCQ) / (NIQ − XIQ + TXTQ + XINTQ + DPQ)).
Interest coverage Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to interest expenses (sum
of four most recent fiscal quarters) (Compustat (NIQ − XIQ + TXTQ + XINTQ + DPQ) /
XINTQ).
Firm size Total assets in $ millions (Compustat AT).
Leverage Ratio of total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) to total assets (Compustat
(DLTT + DLC) / AT).
Firm age Number of years since the stock inclusion in the CRSP database.
Number of segments Number of business segments in which firm operates (Compustat).
Market-to-book Ratio of market value of assets (total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity)
to total assets (Compustat (AT + CSHO × PRCC F − CEQ) / AT).
R&D Ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets (Compustat XRD / AT).
Stock return volatility Standard deviation (annualized) of returns estimated with daily stock returns (CRSP).
Free cash flow Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization minus capital expenditures
to total assets (Compustat (EBITDA − CAPX) / AT).
Return on assets Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets (Compustat
EBITDA / AT).
Governance index Governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), which is based on 24 antitakeover provi-
sions (IRRC).
Stock return Annual stock return for the fiscal year (CRSP).
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Variable Definition
Investment Ratio of capital expenditures to lagged net property, plant and equipment (Compustat CAPEX /
PPENT).
Net debt issues Ratio of long term net debt issues (issuance minus reduction of debt) proceeds to lagged total
assets (Compustat (DLTIS − DLTR) / AT).
Net equity issues Ratio of net equity proceeds (issuance minus purchases of stock) to lagged total assets (Compustat
(SSTK − PRSTKC) / AT).
SEO proceeds Ratio of SEO proceeds (SDC New Issues) to lagged total assets (Computstat AT).
Dividends Ratio of common dividends to lagged total assets (Compustat DVC / AT).
Volatility of ROA Standard deviation (annualized) of return on assets over the last eight quarters (Compustat).
CEO total pay Total CEO compensation in $ thousands (Execucomp TDC1).
CEO salary CEO salary in $ thousands (Execucomp SALARY).
CEO bonus CEO bonus in $ thousands (Execucomp BONUS).
CEO option Value of option grants to the CEO based on grant-date Black-Scholes value in $ thousands (Exe-
cucomp OPTION AWARDS BLK VALUE).
CEO stock Value of restricted stock grants to the CEO based on grant-date fair value in $ thousands (Execu-
comp STOCK AWARDS FV).
CEO ownership Number of shares held by the CEO divided by number of shares outstanding (ExecuComp).
CEO tenure Number of years since the date the director became CEO (ExecuComp).
Male Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a director is male, and zero otherwise (BoardEx).
Age Age when director joins the board (BoardEx).
MBA Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a director holds an MBA when he joins the board,
and zero othwerwise (BoardEx).
Financial education Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a director has a financial education when he joins the
board, defined as a degree in the field of economics, accounting, finance, management, and zero
otherwise (BoardEx).
Audit or finance committee Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a director is a member of the finance or audit com-
mittees, and zero otherwise (BoardEx).
Past audit or finance committee Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a director has been a member of the finance or audit
committee based on past work experience, and zero otherwise (BoardEx).
Past financial role Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a director has held a financial role (CFO, finance
director, treasury, accountant) based on past work experience, and zero otherwise (BoardEx).
Financial firm connection Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a director has held a position in a financial firm (SIC
6000-6999) based on past work experience, and zero otherwise (BoardEx).
Financial firm board member Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a director has held a board position in a financial firm
(SIC 6000-6999) based on past work experience, and zero otherwise (BoardEx).
Number of board positions Number of board positions held by a director (BoardEx).
Number of past boards positions Number of board positions a director has held based on past work experience (BoardEx).
Bank connection Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a director has a board or non-board position in another
firm with outstanding loans that have at least one bank (lead arranger or other participant) in
common with the firm’s current banks (BoardEx).
Bank connection - violation Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a director has a board or non-board position in another
firm with outstanding loans that have at least one bank (lead arranger or other participant) in
common with the firm’s banks in the syndicate of the loan for which a violation occurs (BoardEx).
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A Examples
There is anecdotal evidence that creditors demand changes to board composition as a conse-
quence of credit renegotiations. We search Forms 8-K and 10-Q, and press releases for examples
in which lenders contractually demand changes. Although the language used does not say that
lenders have the right to nominate directors (probably because of issues with lender liability),
the contracts often say that the new directors have to be “acceptable to the lenders.”
A.1 Quadrant 4 System Corporation
This is an example of explicit credit intervention in the board nomination process. The ap-
pointment occurs one year after the agreement to appoint directors.
The company (Quadrant 4 System Corporation) and its lender (BMO) entered into a for-
bearance agreement effective March 17, 2016. Under the terms of the forbearance agreement,
“the Forbearance Parties have agreed to, among other things,. . . , appoint three new members
to the Company’s Board of Directors.”
“On March 16, 2017, the Company’s Board of Directors (the Board) appointed Robert H.
Steele, Brad Buxton, and Michael Silverman to fill its three current vacancies. There are no
understandings or arrangements between Messrs. Steele, Buxton, or Silverman and any other
person to which Messrs. Steele, Buxton, or Silverman was selected as a director of the Com-
pany; provided, however that as a condition of BMOs agreement to enter into the Forbearance
Agreement, BMO required that the Company appoint three new directors who were acceptable
to the Board and to BMO.”
Note that the three directors were appointed exactly one (calendar) year after the agreement.
A.2 RCS Capital Corporation
This is also an example of explicit credit intervention in the board nomination process. Here
the appointment occurs five days after the agreement, but in a new fiscal year.
“RCS Capital Corporation (the “Company”) and the other Loan Parties (defined therein)
have entered into a forbearance agreement, dated as of December 31, 2015 (the “First Lien
Forbearance Agreement”), with the lenders party”
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“Pursuant to requirements under the First Lien Forbearance Agreement and the Second Lien
Forbearance Agreement for the appointment of an independent director reasonably acceptable to
such lenders, on December 30, 2015, the board of directors (the “Board”) of the Company
appointed Bradley E. Scher as a director of the Company and the Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Board effective as of January 4, 2016.”
Although the director was appointed only five days after the agreement, the appointment
occurred in the new fiscal year.
A.3 Peekay Boutiques Inc.
This is also an example of explicit credit intervention in the board nomination process. In this
example, after a covenant violation, there are a series of contract amendments that eventually
lead to the appointment of an independent director. The appointment occurs two years after
the first covenant violation.
December 31, 2012: The company (Peekay Boutiques Inc.) entered into a financing agree-
ment with a group of lenders.
March 31, 2014: The company obtains a first amendment to the agreement, which includes
a covenant waiver.
Between March 31, 2014, and February 22, 2016: The company obtains eight successive
amendments to the agreement. These amendments include multiple covenant waivers, and
increasingly stricter conditions.
February 22, 2016: the company enters into a forbearance agreement, which, among other
things, requires that:
“The company must appoint an independent director nominated by the Consenting Term A
Lenders to the Board of Directors of the Company and the applicable equivalent Board of each
of the Company’s subsidiaries. On February 22, 2016, the Loan Parties appointed Matthew R.
Khan as independent director in satisfaction of this requirement.”
The appointment was effective on February 24, 2016, two years after the first covenant
waiver.
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A.4 Saratoga Resources, Inc.
This is also an example of explicit credit intervention in the board nomination process.
“Saratoga Resources, Inc. today announced that it has appointed Richard Nevins to its board
of directors and as a member of the board’s existing independent committee.”
“Mr. Nevins’ appointment was made pursuant to the terms of the amendment to the exist-
ing forbearance agreement with the Company’s senior lenders. Under that amendment, if an
additional independent director acceptable to the lenders was appointed to the board and inde-
pendent committee, the forbearance period would be extended until May 22, 2015. By separate
agreement, the lenders agreed to extend the forbearance period until June 5, 2015.”
A.5 Hooper Holmes, Inc.
This is a case in which a covenant violations is closely linked to the appointment of new
independent directors, although no direct link is mentioned. In July 2006, the company reports
an agreement with lenders relative to actual and expected covenant violations, and the addition
of a new independent director.
“Hooper Holmes, Inc. (the “Company”) has agreed to the terms of a Notice of Default,
Reservation of Rights and Amendatory Letter (Amended and Restated) to its Amended and
Restated Credit Agreement. The letter, provided by Wachovia Bank, National Association, as
agent and lender under the credit agreement, was prompted by the Company’s seeking a waiver
from its lenders of actual and likely future violations of certain financial covenants set forth in
the credit agreement.”
“Although the lenders are not granting a waiver of the covenant violations, they have agreed
to forbear from terminating the credit commitments under the credit agreement, declaring all
credit obligations immediately due and payable, and exercising their rights and remedies under
the credit agreement, until the earlier of (i) the expiration of the Forbearance Period, or (ii) the
occurrence of an event of default under the credit agreement other than the actual or anticipated
violations of the financial covenants described above.”
The original date of the letter was July 13, 2006. “On July 27, 2006, the Board of Directors
of the Company (the “Board”), acting upon the recommendation of the Governance and Nom-
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inating Committee, elected John W. Remshard as a director, effective immediately. The Board
also appointed Mr. Remshard to the Audit Committee of the Board. There is no arrangement
or understanding between Mr. Remshard and any other persons under which he was selected as
a director.”
A press release reports “John brings a wealth of knowledge and wisdom from having led the
turnaround of Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield from a bankrupt nonprofit to a highly successful
public company with a market capitalization of $6.5 billion.”
A.6 Akorn, Inc.
This is an example of explicit credit intervention in the workings of the board, without requiring
the appointment of a new director. The forebearance agreement with the lenders required the
company to hire a particular consulting firm to ”assist in the development and execution of its
restructuring plan and provide oversight and direction to the Company’s day-to-day operations.”
“During the Company’s discussion with the Consultant, the Company agreed to establish a
special committee of the board (the ”Corporate Governance Committee”) (...). The Consultant
will interface with the Corporate Governance Committee regarding the Company’s reestructuring
actions.”
B Robustness
We perform several robustness checks of our primary findings. First, we consider Poisson
regressions that take into account the count nature of the dependent variable (number of in-
dependent directors). These regressions assume that yit is independently Poisson distributed
with conditional mean equal to







it−2 + αt + fi
}
. (1)
Parameter β is again a semi-elasticity, and thus, it can be directly compared to the previous
estimates. We report the results in column (1) of Table IA.12. The Poisson regression yields
an estimate of β that is just slightly lower (19%) than those from log-linear regressions.
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Second, we consider the possibility that director appointments are simply a consequence of
CEO turnover. Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) show that violations lead to more CEO turnover.
Thus, it is possible that new CEOs bring new directors to the board. If this is the case, the
effect of covenants on board independence could still be causal but perhaps less interesting
because this would simply be a side effect of another result that has already been documented
in the literature. To address this possibility, we drop from the sample all observations in years
in which a CEO is replaced and in the two years thereafter. Table IA.12, column (2), reports
the results. If anything, the estimated effect is stronger, at 30%, when using a sample of
firms without CEO turnover. Table IA.13 in the Internet Appendix presents estimates using
alternative samples of firms without CEO turnover.
Third, we consider an alternative measure of the implied covenant violation indicator exclud-
ing debt-to-EBITDA covenants. This is likely to add noise to our estimates (debt-to-EBITDA
violations are associated with 84% of the violations in our full sample). Table IA.12, column (3),
reports the results. The estimate remains qualitatively similar (18%) to those in Table 3, but
it is statistically weaker. We conclude that including debt-to-EBITDA covenants is important
for estimating the effects of violations with precision, but we find qualitatively similar results
even when we ignore debt-to-EBITDA covenants. In column (4) of Table IA.12, we add interest
coverage covenants to our list of covenants (i.e., our binding distance variable now considers five
different covenants). Adding new covenants changes the definition of the discontinuity sample
because the number and the types of covenants affect the calculation of the binding distance.
The introduction of interest coverage covenants has only a minor impact on the estimated β,
which is now 0.20 and statistically significant. Table IA.14 in the Internet Appendix replicates
all specifications in Table 3 when including the interest coverage covenant.
Fourth, we consider alternative sample periods. In columns (5) and (6) of Table IA.12, we
divide the sample into observations before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002,
which, among other things, mandated more independent boards. We find strikingly similar
estimates for both the pre- and post-SOX subsamples (20% and 21%, respectively). Despite
the significant reduction in sample size, the effects remain statistically significant. In column
(7) of Table IA.12, we extend our sample to include observations after 2008, up to 2014. We
replicate our main specification using the extended sample and find an estimated β of 0.17
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(t = 3.57). Adding observations from 2009 to 2014 has a small impact on the magnitude
of the estimated effects, but overall, the estimated effects are similar and remain statistically
significant. Table IA.15 in the Internet Appendix replicates all specifications in Table 3 when
using the extended sample.
Finally, in column (8) of Table IA.12 we replace the number of independent directors with
the ratio of the number of independent directors to board size. We find that violations reduce
the fraction of independent directors by 16%, which is equivalent to 11 percentage points
when evaluated at the sample average (70%). Table IA.16 in the Internet Appendix provides
additional estimates using the fraction of independent directors as the outcome variable.
Table IA.17 shows estimates of the regression in equation (3) using either one or three lags
instead of two lags. Using one lag, the effects are economically weaker but can still be detected
(statistically significant in some but not all specifications). This is expected because the process
of appointing directors may take time. When using three lags, the effects are similar to those
obtained with two lags and are typically economically and statistically significant. However,
the three-lag effects are less statistically precise because of the reduction in sample size. Table
IA.18 shows estimates of the regression in equation (3) in which the covenant violation dummy is
defined using calendar year (in alternative to fiscal year) as there may be a mismatch between
the actual violation year and its fiscal year. This generates a different timing for director
appointments. The effects are statistically and economically significant for all lags. Table
IA.19 shows estimates of the regression in equation (3) including the annual stock return as a
control variable to further control for past market performance.
For our baseline results, we adopt a conservative criterion to determine which observations
to retain in the discontinuity sample. According to this criterion, an observation is retained
only if, for each quarter of the year, the quarterly binding distance falls inside the interval.
Table IA.20 shows that our results are robust to a less stringent criterion in which we only
require the annual binding distance to lie within the interval.
B.1 Who are the directors appointed after covenant violations?
We construct two alternative control groups. In the first of these groups, we match each new
director to a randomly chosen independent director retained by the same firm for at least two
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years after the first violation. Panel A of Table IA.22 reports the average director characteristics
using this alternative control group. This choice of control group – retained directors – is a
conservative one. If creditors do indeed influence board composition, they may support the
retention of connected directors after a violation. This control group allows us to match a
higher number of directors (223). Compared to this control group, newly appointed directors
are younger, more likely to have a finance-related degree, and more likely to have past experience
in a financial role. In addition, the difference between the two groups in terms of connections
to current banks is 21% and statistically significant (t = 4.58). For connections via a bank in
the syndicate of the loan for which a violation occurs, the difference is 17% (t = 3.56).
Panel B of Table IA.22 reports the average director characteristics using a second alternative
control group. The control group now includes independent directors who are members of the
board in the two years before the first violation and remained on the board for at least two years
after the violation. This control group allows us to match an even higher number of directors
(226). The results are consistent with those in Panels A and B. The difference between the two
groups in terms of connections to current banks is 32% (t = 6.31).
We conclude that new directors appointed after violations are likely to have connections to
creditors. The large majority of these connections occur through the banks of loans for which
there is a violation. These connections are unlikely to be chance events; connections via banks
in syndicated loans are infrequent in the control groups.
B.2 Which firms appoint new directors after covenant violations?
Not all firms are likely to respond to loan covenant violations in the same way. Whether
firms experience major or minor board changes after violations depends on the reason that
such changes occur. For example, if lenders (directly or indirectly) promote board changes,
we expect to find large effects among firms that have closer relationships with their lenders.
In contrast, if lenders are indifferent to board composition, the effect of violations on board
composition should be independent of the identity of lenders. To test for the hypothesized
differential board responses, we expand the specification in equation (3) by interacting the
covenant violation indicator with a particular proxy and examining the effect of each proxy in
a separate regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of independent
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directors, and the regressions include firm and year fixed effects (as in column (1) of Table 3).
Panel A of Table IA.24 presents the results for the lending relationship proxies. We first
consider the impact of relationship lending on the effect of violations on board appointments.
For each loan in our sample, we first identify the lead arranger and then count the number of
past term loans that a borrower has obtained from the same lead arranger. We then create
an indicator of whether the borrower has at least two historical lending relationships with
its current lead arranger (past loans ≥ 2; 302 observations) and an indicator of whether the
borrower has no historical lending relationship or only one (past loans < 2; 363 observations).
Column (1) shows that the estimated β is 32% for borrowers with more historical lending
relationships and just 13% (statistically insignificant) for borrowers with no such relationships.
The difference—19% —is statistically significant at the 10% level. Column (2) shows similar
estimates when we include firm-level control variables.
In columns (3) and (4), we use all loans (i.e., term loans and credit lines) to count the
number of past loans that a borrower has obtained from the same lead arranger. We then
create an indicator of whether the borrower has at least five historical lending relationships with
its current lead arranger (past loans ≥ 5; 227 observations) and an indicator of whether the
borrower has fewer than five historical lending relationships (past loans < 5; 438 observations).
We again find a larger violation effect for the group of borrowers with more historical lending
relationships. The effect for the group of borrowers with fewer historical lending relationships
is smaller, but the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant.
Firms without credit ratings are more dependent on bank debt, which makes banks more
powerful in negotiations at the time of covenant violations. Furthermore, in the absence of
public debt markets and ratings agency monitoring, lender monitoring of unrated firms may
be more important. These reasons suggest a stronger effect of violations on the appointment
of new directors in unrated firms. However, unrated firms may find it difficult to recruit new
directors, as these firms are likely to be more opaque and have a weaker financial position.
Columns (5) and (6) present the estimated coefficients for rated firms (406 observations) and
unrated firms (259 observations). We find that the violation effect is stronger for unrated firms
than for rated firms. The difference is economically sizable (23% with control variables), but it
is not statistically significant.
8
Creditors’ bargaining power after violations is tempered by cross-default and cross-acceleration
provisions because such provisions reduce creditors’ incentives to declare a borrower in default.
This is, however, less of a concern if the borrower’s other loans are relatively small, that is,
if a single loan constitutes most of the borrower’s debt. To construct a proxy for debt con-
centration, we create an indicator of whether the firm needs to repay at least one large loan
(large loan; 450 observations) and an indicator for all other cases (small loan). We consider
a loan to be large if the ratio of the loan amount to total assets at origination is above the
median. Panel B of Table IA.24, columns (1) and (2), presents the results. We find that the
effect is stronger for the large loan group than that for those cases with no such loans. The
17% difference between the two groups (in column (1)) is statistically significant at the 10%
level. In addition, columns (3) and (4) show that the effect is stronger for the group of loans
with shorter maturity (i.e., the residual loan maturity is below the median) than for the group
of loans with longer maturity. This result is consistent with the idea that creditors’ bargaining
power is likely to be greater when the firm has the need to refinance or renegotiate loans that
are soon to come due.
Finally, in Panel B of Table IA.23, columns (5)-(8), we consider the effect of covenant
slack at loan origination on the impact of violations on board independence. The evidence
in Demiroglu and James (2010) motivates this analysis. They show that firms with tighter
covenants at origination experience less significant changes in investment and debt issuance
after violations. A possible explanation is that borrowers are more likely to agree to tight
covenants when they expect violations to have little impact on investment and financial policy.
A similar logic may apply to our setup: Managers and incumbent directors might be more
reluctant to agree to tight covenants if they expect creditors to use violations to force changes
in board structure.
We measure covenant tightness by the binding distance and tightness at origination, as
described in Section 1. Using either measure, we find that the effect of violations on board
appointments is stronger in those firms with less tight covenants at origination (high binding
distance and high tightness groups). The differences between the two groups are economically
significant at 16% and 20% in columns (6) and (8) with control variables but not sufficiently
precise to be statistically significant.
9
Overall, the evidence shows that the impact of violations on board appointments is econom-
ically stronger in firms for which we would expect more creditor intervention after violations.
These are firms that regularly borrow from the same banks, firms that have one large loan,
firms without credit ratings, and firms with less tight covenants at loan origination.
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Table IA.1: Comparison with DealScan, IRRC and Compustat Samples
This table presents mean, number of observations, and number of firms for each variable. Our sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. Financial industries are omitted (SIC codes
6000-6999). The table also presents summary statistics for the samples of DealScan firms, IRRC firms and Compustat firms from 1994 to 2008. Covenant
violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth,
and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Financial ratios are winsorized
at the bottom and top 1% level.

























Number of independent directors 6.39 2,801 597 - - - 6.54 9,201 1,574 - - -
Number of non-independent directors 2.76 2,801 597 - - - 2.89 9,201 1,574 - - -
Ratio of indep. to non-indep. directors 3.45 2,801 597 - - - 3.43 9,201 1,574 - - -
Number of directors 9.15 2,801 597 - - - 9.43 9,201 1,574 - - -
Firm size ($ millions) 3,542 2,801 597 1,534 11,021 2,603 5,078 9,201 1,574 1,394 52,447 8,665
Leverage 0.25 2,801 597 0.27 11,021 2,603 0.23 9,201 1,574 0.22 52,447 8,665
Firm age 22.56 2,801 597 14.18 11,021 2,603 26.58 9,201 1,574 13.51 52,447 8,665
Number of segments 2.88 2,801 597 2.28 11,021 2,603 2.77 9,201 1,574 1.90 52,447 8,665
Market-to-book 1.88 2,801 597 1.77 11,021 2,603 2.05 9,201 1,574 2.17 52,447 8,665
R&D 0.02 2,801 597 0.02 11,021 2,603 0.03 9,201 1,574 0.06 52,447 8,665
Stock return volatility 0.38 2,801 597 0.50 11,021 2,603 0.36 9,201 1,574 0.58 52,447 8,665
Free cash flow 0.09 2,801 597 0.05 11,021 2,603 0.09 9,201 1,574 -0.04 52,447 8,665
Return on assets 0.15 2,801 597 0.12 11,021 2,603 0.15 9,201 1,574 0.02 52,447 8,665
Governance index 9.33 2,801 597 - - - 9.28 9,201 1,574 - - -
CEO ownership 0.02 2,801 597 - - - 0.02 9,201 1,574 - - -
CEO tenure 7.51 2,801 597 - - - 7.43 9,201 1,574 - - -
Covenant violation 0.24 2,801 597 0.34 11,021 2,603 - - - - - -
Binding distance 0.07 2,801 597 -0.08 11,012 2,603 - - - - - -
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Table IA.2: Covenant Data - Quarterly Frequency
This table presents mean, standard deviation, minimum, 10th percentile, median, 90th percentile, maximum, number of observations, and number of firms
for covenant data. Threshold is the minimum current ratio, net worth and tangible net worth and maximum debt-to EBITDA specified for each covenant
across all outstanding loans in each quarter (omitting observations with no threshold data). Binding distance is the relative distance between the actual
accounting variable and the corresponding covenant threshold. Tightness is the distance between the actual accounting variable and the corresponding
covenant threshold divided by the firm-specific standard deviation of the accounting variable over the full sample period. The sample consists of quarterly
















Current ratio 2.04 1.25 0.29 0.90 1.76 3.33 11.90 11,114 597
Net worth ($ millions) 1,351 5,468 -2,612 156 514 2,505 160,000 11,199 597
Tangible net worth ($ millions) 1,331 5,344 -2,612 155 508 2,478 152,914 11,081 597
Debt-to-EBITDA 3.20 4.88 0.00 0.12 1.87 5.95 35.71 10,446 597
Threshold - current ratio 1.41 0.45 0.50 1.00 1.30 2.00 3.00 808 597
Threshold - net worth ($ millions) 902 6,182 5 100 300 1,150 180,563 3,727 597
Threshold - tangible net worth ($ millions) 531 2,186 5 55 232 1,000 43,950 2,112 597
Threshold - debt-to-EBITDA 3.49 1.10 0.55 2.25 3.25 5.00 11.00 6,587 597
Binding distance - current ratio 0.64 0.67 -0.35 0.03 0.48 1.44 3.31 808 597
Binding distance - net worth 1.08 2.48 -0.29 0.14 0.52 1.65 19.03 3,727 597
Binding distance - tangible net worth 1.66 5.28 -0.83 0.14 0.73 2.63 111.99 2,112 597
Binding distance - debt-to-EBITDA 0.16 1.20 -6.49 -0.42 0.44 0.95 1.00 6,587 597
Tightness - current ratio 1.42 1.20 -1.14 0.07 1.29 3.11 4.43 808 597
Tightness - net worth 0.82 0.68 -0.56 0.15 0.70 1.65 3.35 3,727 597
Tightness - tangible net worth 0.91 0.73 -0.77 0.16 0.78 1.83 3.65 2,112 597
Tightness - debt-to-EBITDA 1.00 2.55 -3.35 -0.42 0.40 3.37 18.85 6,587 597
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Table IA.3: Covenant Data - Quarterly Frequency
This table presents average initial covenant tightness, number of observations, and fraction of covenant violations based on the current ratio, net worth,
tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA. Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates a covenant during a quarter.
Initial tightness is the distance between the actual accounting variable and the corresponding covenant threshold at loan origination divided by the firm-
specific standard deviation of the accounting variable over the full sample period. Our sample consists of quarterly observations on Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. The table compares our sample
statistics with those in Chava and Roberts (2008).













Current ratio 1.44 808 0.09 1.09 5,428 0.15
Net worth 0.58 3,727 0.05 0.68 13,021 0.14
Tangible net worth 0.65 2,138 0.04 0.68 13,021 0.14
Debt-to-EBITDA 0.83 6,587 0.19 - - -
All covenants 0.53 9,721 0.16 - - -13
Table IA.4: Covenant Data - Annual Frequency
This table presents the fraction of covenant violations and number of violations based on the current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-
EBITDA. Current ratio is current assets over current liabilities. Net worth is assets minus total liabilities. Tangible net worth is tangible assets minus total
liabilities. Debt-to-EBITDA is total debt over earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. Covenant violation is a dummy variable that
takes a value of one if the firm violates a covenant (at least one out of four covenants in the case of all covenants) during the year in at least one quarter.
The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated
loans data are available from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the relative binding distance to the
covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h).

















Current ratio 0.28 5 0.30 14 0.27 22 0.14 33
Net worth 0.16 9 0.11 19 0.10 30 0.07 81
Tangible net worth 0.24 7 0.15 10 0.10 14 0.06 39
Debt-to-EBITDA 0.57 30 0.41 88 0.34 147 0.30 570
All covenants 0.46 50 0.37 129 0.32 211 0.24 675
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Table IA.5: Averages for Violation and Non-Violation Groups - Sam-
ple outside Bandwidth
This table presents sample averages of board composition and firm characteristics for observations with no
covenant violation and observations with at least one covenant violation. A covenant violation occurs if the firm
violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA)
during the year in at least one quarter. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available
from DealScan. The sample includes observations outside the bandwidth (h = 0.4).
No violation Violation Difference t-statistic
(1) (2) (1)-(2)
Number of independent directors (2 leads) 6.41 6.36 0.05 0.44
Number of independent directors (2 lags) 5.95 5.94 0.01 0.12
Number of independent directors (1 lag) 5.97 5.98 -0.01 -0.10
Number of independent directors 6.02 6.03 -0.01 -0.08
Number of non-independent directors (2 leads) 2.74 2.54 0.20 2.47
Number of non-independent directors (2 lags) 3.23 3.00 0.23 2.35
Number of non-independent directors (1 lag) 3.19 2.94 0.24 2.61
Number of non-independent directors 3.13 2.89 0.23 2.54
Firm size ($ millions) 3,403 5,234 -1,831 -1.93
Leverage 0.20 0.34 -0.13 -15.67
Firm age 22.34 22.23 0.11 0.12
Number of segments 2.75 3.17 -0.42 -4.28
Market-to-book 2.14 1.51 0.62 13.38
R&D 0.02 0.02 0.00 -1.34
Stock return volatility 0.37 0.45 -0.09 -7.18
Free cash flow 0.11 0.05 0.05 11.29
Return on assets 0.17 0.10 0.07 16.77
Governance index 9.27 9.39 -0.11 -0.84
CEO ownership 0.02 0.02 0.00 1.67
CEO tenure 7.64 6.40 1.24 3.37
Number of observations 1,672 464
Number of firms 495 241
Fraction of observations in violation 0.22
Fraction of firms in violation 0.44
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Table IA.6: Summary Statistics for Violation and Non-Violation Groups
This table presents mean, standard deviation, minimum, 10th percentile, median, 90th percentile, maximum, number of observations, and number of firms
for each variable. Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio,
net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. The sample in
Panel A includes observations in which the absolute value of the relative binding distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4).
The sample in Panel B includes observations outside the bandwidth.















Number of independent directors 6.36 2.30 1.00 3.00 6.00 9.00 14.00 665 222
Number of non-independent directors 2.95 1.84 1.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 10.00 665 222
Ratio of indep. to non-indep. directors 3.42 2.72 0.10 0.75 2.67 8.00 13.00 665 222
Number of directors 9.31 2.11 5.00 7.00 9.00 12.00 19.00 665 222
Firm size ($ millions) 2,711 4,374 73 346 1,269 6,153 35,525 665 222
Leverage 0.31 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.33 0.49 0.74 665 222
Firm age 23.34 17.50 1.00 7.00 18.00 43.00 81.00 665 222
Number of segments 2.98 2.08 1.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 10.00 665 222
Market-to-book 1.47 0.57 0.70 0.96 1.37 2.10 6.24 665 222
R&D 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.24 665 222
Stock return volatility 0.37 0.18 0.12 0.19 0.33 0.59 1.67 665 222
Free cash flow 0.07 0.05 -0.22 0.01 0.08 0.13 0.26 665 222
Return on assets 0.13 0.06 -0.17 0.07 0.12 0.20 0.41 665 222
Governance index 9.42 2.66 3.00 6.00 9.00 13.00 15.00 665 222
CEO ownership 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.30 665 222
CEO tenure 7.94 7.92 0.00 1.00 6.00 17.00 49.00 665 222
Covenant violation 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 665 222
Binding distance 0.06 0.18 -0.39 -0.22 0.10 0.27 0.38 665 222
16















Number of independent directors 6.40 2.05 1.00 4.00 6.00 9.00 15.00 2,136 546
Number of non-independent directors 2.70 1.58 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 13.00 2,136 546
Ratio of indep. to non-indep. directors 3.47 2.54 0.17 1.00 2.58 8.00 13.00 2,136 546
Number of directors 9.10 2.13 4.00 6.00 9.00 12.00 17.00 2,136 546
Firm size 3,801 12,725 43 374 1,226 7,605 270,634 2,136 546
Leverage 0.23 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.23 0.43 0.87 2,136 546
Firm age 22.31 17.40 1.00 6.00 17.00 42.00 81.00 2,136 546
Number of segments 2.84 1.85 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 10.00 2,136 546
Market-to-book 2.00 1.25 0.62 1.07 1.64 3.31 8.89 2,136 546
R&D 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.37 2,136 546
Stock return volatility 0.39 0.21 0.12 0.19 0.34 0.65 1.74 2,136 546
Free cash flow 0.10 0.09 -0.79 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.36 2,136 546
Return on assets 0.16 0.09 -0.66 0.07 0.15 0.26 0.44 2,136 546
Governance index 9.30 2.63 3.00 6.00 9.00 13.00 17.00 2,136 546
CEO ownership 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.30 2,136 546
CEO tenure 7.37 7.38 0.00 1.00 5.00 17.00 48.00 2,136 546
Covenant violation 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2,136 546
Binding distance 0.07 1.66 -7.36 -1.17 0.43 0.99 4.14 2,136 546
17
Table IA.7: Regression of Number of Independent Directors
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects, first differences and ordinary least squares (OLS) panel
regressions of the logarithm of the number of independent directors. Covenant violation is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth,
tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. The firm-level control
variables are firm size (log), leverage, firm age (log), number of segments (log), market-to-book (log), R&D,
stock return volatility, free cash flow, return on assets, governance index, CEO ownership, and CEO tenure. All
explanatory variables are lagged two years. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available
from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the relative binding
distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for
variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Firm fixed effects First differences OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.32*** 0.23***
(3.47) (3.66) (3.37) (3.21) (3.30) (2.68)
Firm size (log) 0.10 0.14 0.03
(1.39) (0.93) (1.25)
Leverage -0.09 -0.14 -0.15
(-0.44) (-0.40) (-0.77)
Firm age (log) 0.19* 0.24*** 0.06**
(1.96) (3.97) (2.03)
Number of segments (log) 0.11** 0.01 0.00
(2.27) (0.26) (0.08)
Market-to-book (log) 0.13 0.11 0.09
(1.55) (1.22) (1.14)
R&D -1.80 2.44 -1.01
(-1.12) (1.26) (-1.36)
Stock return volatility 0.03 0.14* -0.00
(0.38) (1.88) (-0.01)
Free cash flow 0.59 -0.18 0.82
(1.36) (-0.32) (1.59)
Return on assets -0.78 0.10 0.22
(-1.16) (0.13) (0.42)
Governance index 0.00 0.01 0.04***
(0.16) (0.42) (4.03)
CEO ownership -0.75 0.30 -1.71***
(-1.05) (0.71) (-3.11)
CEO tenure -0.00 0.00 -0.01
(-0.59) (0.19) (-1.50)
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.176 0.249 0.137 0.167 0.301 0.497
Number of observations 665 665 472 472 665 665
Number of firms 222 222 214 214 222 222
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Table IA.8: Regression of Firm Characteristics
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of firm size (log), leverage, firm age (log),
number of segments (log), market-to-book (log), R&D, stock return volatility, free cash flow, return on assets,
governance index, CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and investment. Covenant violation is a dummy variable that
takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible
net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. All explanatory variables are con-
temporaneous. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)
non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. The sample
includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the relative binding distance to the covenant
threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions.
Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Covenant violation
Coefficient t-statistic
Firm size (log) -0.0031 -0.19
Leverage -0.0033 -0.05
Firm age (log) 0.0030 0.13
Number of segments (log) -0.0792 -0.83
Market-to-book (log) 0.0273 0.70
R&D 0.0020 0.76
Stock return volatility 0.0353 1.09
Free cash flow 0.0026 0.25
Return on assets 0.0006 0.06
Governance index -0.0082 -0.06
CEO ownership 0.0052 0.85
CEO tenure -0.1890 -0.19
Investment -0.0020 -0.38
2nd order polynomial Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
Number of observations 665
Number of firms 222
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Table IA.9: Regression of Number of Independent Directors - Placebo Test using SEC-
DealScan Matched Sample
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the logarithm of the number of independent directors. Covenant violation is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA)
during the year in at least one quarter. All explanatory variables are lagged two years. The estimates are shown using different distances to the real
threshold, which is set at zero. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994
to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. The sample drops observations in case the covenant violation dummy is zero but there
is a covenant violation according to the SEC’s 10-Q or 10-K filings. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the relative
binding distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h). Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics
adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Distance to real threshold
−0.4 −0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Covenant violation 0.19 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.24*** -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.01
(1.00) (0.19) (0.80) (0.35) (3.35) (-0.87) (0.15) (-0.97) (-0.37)
Marginal effects (at mean) 1.21 0.13 0.70 0.19 1.53 -0.26 0.06 -0.26 -0.06
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.209 0.220 0.205 0.150 0.174 0.177 0.202 0.185 0.197
Number of observations 94 139 220 381 590 778 958 983 1,008
Number of firms 41 59 87 142 203 248 292 291 295
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Table IA.10: Summary Statistics - SEC Sample
This table presents mean, standard deviation, minimum, 10th percentile, median, 90th percentile, maximum, number of observations, and number of firms
for each variable. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) firms from 1994 to 2008. Financial
industries are omitted (SIC codes 6000-6999). Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm reports a covenant violation in















Number of independent directors 6.63 2.30 1.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 22.00 8,514 1,296
Number of non-independent directors 2.91 1.75 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 13.00 8,514 1,296
Ratio of indep. to non-indep. directors 3.46 2.70 0.08 0.83 2.50 8.00 15.00 8,514 1,296
Number of directors 9.54 2.37 4.00 7.00 9.00 13.00 28.00 8,514 1,296
Firm size ($ millions) 5,340 15,336 38 336 1,624 13,779 697,239 8,514 1,296
Leverage 0.24 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.43 0.89 8,514 1,296
Firm age 27.54 19.80 1.00 7.00 24.00 59.00 81.00 8,514 1,296
Number of segments 2.81 1.94 1.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 10.00 8,514 1,296
Market-to-book 2.01 1.45 0.53 1.07 1.56 3.38 27.09 8,514 1,296
R&D 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.66 8,514 1,296
Stock return volatility 0.36 0.20 0.11 0.16 0.31 0.60 2.24 8,514 1,296
Free cash flow 0.09 0.09 -0.92 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.36 8,514 1,296
Return on assets 0.15 0.08 -0.67 0.07 0.14 0.25 0.43 8,514 1,296
Governance index 9.37 2.63 2.00 6.00 9.00 13.00 17.00 8,514 1,296
CEO ownership 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.34 8,514 1,296
CEO tenure 7.38 7.44 0.00 1.00 5.00 17.00 55.00 8,514 1,296
Covenant violation 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 8,514 1,296
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Table IA.11: Regression of Number of Independent Directors - SEC
Sample
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the logarithm of the number of independent
directors. Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm reports a covenant
violation in SEC’s 10-Q or 10-K filings. Regressions include third-order polynomials and quintile indicator
variables for leverage, return on assets, interest expense-to-assets ratio, net worth-to-assets ratio, and cash-to-
assets ratio. The firm-level control variables are firm size (log), leverage, firm age (log), number of segments
(log), market-to-book (log), R&D, stock return volatility, free cash flow, return on assets, governance index,
CEO ownership, and CEO tenure. All explanatory variables are lagged two years. The sample consists of annual
observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008. Refer
to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
All violations First violations New violations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation - SEC 0.04** 0.04** 0.04* 0.04* 0.03* 0.03*
(2.34) (2.53) (1.81) (1.93) (1.77) (1.77)
Marginal effects (at mean) 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.20 0.20
Polyn. and covenant quintile indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.173 0.198 0.169 0.194 0.172 0.198
Number of observations 8,514 8,514 7,741 7,741 8,337 8,337
Number of firms 1,296 1,296 1,223 1,223 1,294 1,294
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Table IA.12: Regression of Number of Independent Directors - Robustness
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects (columns (2)-(8)) panel regressions of the logarithm of the number of independent directors. Covenant
violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth,
and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. All explanatory variables are lagged two years. Column (1) presents estimates of a Poisson
regression. Column (2) presents estimates of a regression excluding observations in the year in which the CEO is replaced as well as the two years after the
CEO turnover. Column (3) presents estimates of a regression in which debt-to-EBITDA covenants are excluded from the definition of covenant violations.
Column (4) presents estimates of a regression in which interest coverage covenants are included in the definition of covenant violations. In columns (5)
and (6) the sample period is the pre-SOX period (1994-2002) and post-SOX period (2003-2008) respectively. In column (7) the sample period is extended
to 1994-2014. Column (8) presents estimates of a regression in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of the number of independent
directors to board size. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008
for which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the relative binding
distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Covenant violation 0.19*** 0.30*** 0.18* 0.20*** 0.20** 0.21** 0.17*** 0.16***
(3.57) (2.62) (1.75) (2.92) (2.25) (2.17) (3.57) (2.97)
Marginal effects (at mean) 1.21 1.92 1.15 1.30 1.28 1.34 1.15 0.11
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.233 0.199 0.192 0.091 0.221 0.232 0.215
Number of observations 665 360 402 655 294 291 1,008 665
Number of firms 222 132 143 217 108 112 300 222
23
Table IA.13: Regression of Number of Independent Directors - Ex-
cluding CEO Turnover
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the logarithm of the number of independent
directors. Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one
out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in
at least one quarter. The firm-level control variables are firm size (log), leverage, firm age (log), number of
segments (log), market-to-book (log), R&D, stock return volatility, free cash flow, return on assets, governance
index, CEO ownership, and CEO tenure. All explanatory variables are lagged two years. Columns (1) and (2)
present estimates of regressions excluding observations in the two years after the CEO is replaced. Columns (3)
and (4) present estimates of regressions excluding observations in the year in which the CEO is replaced and
a violation occurred as well as the two years after the CEO turnover. Columns (5) and (6) present estimates
of regressions excluding observations in the two years after the CEO is replaced and a violation occurred. The
sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms
from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. The sample includes only
those observations in which the absolute value of the relative binding distance to the covenant threshold is less
than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics
adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.28** 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.26***
(2.49) (2.80) (2.87) (3.27) (2.83) (3.08)
Marginal effects (at mean) 1.60 1.92 1.53 1.60 1.53 1.66
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No No No No No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.248 0.346 0.216 0.292 0.199 0.270
Number of observations 411 411 541 541 576 576
Number of firms 150 150 185 185 195 195
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Table IA.14: Regression of Number of Independent Directors - In-
cluding Interest Coverage Covenant
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects, first differences and ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regressions of the logarithm
of the number of independent directors. Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at
least one out of five covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, debt-to-EBITDA, interest coverage) during the year
in at least one quarter. The firm-level control variables are firm size (log), leverage, firm age (log), number of segments (log),
market-to-book (log), R&D, stock return volatility, free cash flow, return on assets, governance index, CEO ownership, and CEO
tenure. All explanatory variables are lagged two years. Panel A presents estimates using all covenant violations, and Panel B
presents estimates using the first covenant violation or new violations for each firm. The sample consists of annual observations on
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available
from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the relative binding distance to the
covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust
t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A: All Violations
Firm fixed effects First differences OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.24** 0.18**
(2.92) (3.05) (3.50) (3.53) (2.53) (2.06)
Marginal effects (at mean) 1.30 1.36 1.95 1.82 1.56 1.17
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.192 0.253 0.146 0.181 0.303 0.503
Number of observations 655 655 469 469 655 655
Number of firms 217 217 217 217 211 211
Panel B: First and New Violations
First violations New violations
Firm FE First diff. OLS Firm FE First diff. OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.30*** 0.36*** 0.26** 0.18** 0.32*** 0.31**
(3.18) (3.13) (2.26) (2.15) (3.10) (2.46)
Marginal effects (at means) 1.95 2.33 1.69 1.17 2.08 2.01
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No No No No No No
Firm fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.158 0.175 0.386 0.209 0.204 0.332
Number of observations 514 347 514 482 349 482
Number of firms 188 181 188 166 158 166
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Table IA.15: Regression of Number of Independent Directors - Sam-
ple Period 1994-2014
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects, first differences and ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regressions of the logarithm
of the number of independent directors. Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at
least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one
quarter. The firm-level control variables are firm size (log), leverage, firm age (log), number of segments (log), market-to-book (log),
R&D, stock return volatility, free cash flow, return on assets, governance index, CEO ownership, and CEO tenure. All explanatory
variables are lagged two years. Panel A presents estimates using all covenant violations, and Panel B presents estimates using
the first covenant violation or new violations for each firm. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2014 for which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. The
sample includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the relative binding distance to the covenant threshold is
less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for
firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A: All Violations
Firm fixed effects First differences OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.14** 0.13** 0.20*** 0.14**
(3.57) (3.54) (2.47) (2.42) (2.95) (2.46)
Marginal effects (at mean) 1.15 1.08 0.95 0.88 1.36 0.95
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.232 0.275 0.110 0.138 0.290 0.483
Number of observations 1,008 1,008 740 740 1,008 1,008
Number of firms 300 300 286 286 300 300
Panel B: First and New Violations
First violations New violations
Firm FE First diff. OLS Firm FE First diff. OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.25*** 0.22** 0.27*** 0.18** 0.16* 0.25***
(3.11) (2.23) (2.80) (2.49) (1.92) (2.89)
Marginal effects (at means) 1.69 1.49 1.83 1.22 1.08 1.69
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No No No No No No
Firm fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.235 0.144 0.367 0.268 0.141 0.304
Number of observations 720 498 720 744 553 744
Number of firms 244 229 244 235 223 235
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Table IA.16: Regression of Fraction of Independent Directors
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects, first differences and ordinary least squares (OLS) panel
regressions of the logarithm of the ratio of the number of independent directors to the number of non-independent
directors (Panel A) and the ratio of the number of independent directors to board size (Panel B). Covenant
violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants
(current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. The
firm-level control variables are firm size (log), leverage, firm age (log), number of segments (log), market-to-book
(log), R&D, stock return volatility, free cash flow, return on assets, governance index, CEO ownership, and CEO
tenure. All explanatory variables are lagged two years. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data
are available from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the
relative binding distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to Table A1 in
the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A: Ratio of Independent Directors to Non-Independent Directors
Firm fixed effects First differences OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.44*** 0.46*** 0.49** 0.46** 0.44** 0.32*
(3.19) (3.30) (2.59) (2.52) (2.22) (1.78)
Marginal effects (at mean) 1.52 1.59 1.69 1.59 1.52 1.11
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.252 0.304 0.150 0.165 0.376 0.501
Number of observations 665 665 472 472 665 665
Number of firms 222 222 214 214 222 222
Panel B: Ratio of Independent Directors to Board Size
Firm fixed effects First differences OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.16** 0.15** 0.18** 0.13*
(2.97) (3.21) (2.24) (2.11) (2.39) (1.96)
Marginal effects (at mean) 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.09
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.215 0.294 0.151 0.171 0.344 0.483
Number of observations 665 665 472 472 665 665
Number of firms 222 222 214 214 222 222
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Table IA.17: Regression of Number of Independent Directors - Al-
ternative Lags
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects, first differences and ordinary least squares (OLS) panel
regressions of the logarithm of the number of independent directors. Covenant violation is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible
net worth, and debt-to EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. All explanatory variables are lagged
one year in columns (1)-(3) and three years in columns (4)-(6). The sample consists of annual observations
on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated
loans data are available from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute
value of the relative binding distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to
Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
One year lag Three years lag
Firm FE First diff. OLS Firm FE First diff. OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.04 0.13** 0.17** 0.18** 0.12 0.26***
(0.67) (2.20) (2.07) (2.52) (0.99) (2.81)
Marginal effects (at mean) 0.26 0.83 1.09 1.15 0.77 1.66
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.252 0.100 0.315 0.153 0.166 0.337
Number of observations 743 547 743 535 373 535
Number of firms 246 235 246 181 173 181
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Table IA.18: Regression of Number of Independent Directors - Calendar Year
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects, first differences and ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regressions of the logarithm of the number of
independent directors. Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current
ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. The covenant violation dummy is defined using calendar
year (instead of fiscal year). All explanatory variables are lagged one year in columns (1)-(3), two years in columns (4)-(6), and three years in columns
(7)-(9). The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which
syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the relative binding distance
to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for
firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
One year lag Two years lag Three years lag
Firm FE First diff. OLS Firm FE First diff. OLS Firm FE First diff. OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Covenant violation 0.13** 0.23*** 0.21** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.17** 0.13 0.21**
(2.28) (2.91) (2.37) (3.55) (3.09) (3.34) (2.09) (1.01) (2.17)
Marginal effects (at mean) 0.83 1.47 1.34 1.66 1.92 1.98 1.09 0.83 1.34
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.267 0.150 0.357 0.200 0.147 0.345 0.169 0.158 0.352
Number of observations 667 480 667 672 481 672 539 381 539
Number of firms 224 216 224 225 217 225 185 177 185
29
Table IA.19: Regression of Number of Independent Directors - Con-
trolling for Stock Return
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects, first differences and ordinary least squares (OLS) panel
regressions of the logarithm of the ratio of the number of independent directors to the number of non-independent
directors (Panel A) and the ratio of the number of independent directors to board size (Panel B). Covenant
violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants
(current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter.
The firm-level control variables are firm size (log), leverage, firm age (log), number of segments (log), market-to-
book (log), stock return, R&D, stock return volatility, free cash flow, return on assets, governance index, CEO
ownership, and CEO tenure. All explanatory variables are lagged two years. The sample consists of annual
observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which
syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the
absolute value of the relative binding distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4).
Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering
are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Firm fixed effects First differences OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.23***
(3.47) (3.66) (3.40) (3.23) (3.34) (2.67)
Marginal effects (at mean) 1.53 1.60 1.98 1.79 2.04 1.47
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.177 0.251 0.138 0.169 0.302 0.499
Number of observations 662 662 470 470 662 662
Number of firms 221 221 213 213 221 221
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Table IA.20: Regression of Number of Independent Directors - An-
nual Binding Distance
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects, first differences and ordinary least squares (OLS) panel
regressions of the logarithm of the number of independent directors. Covenant violation is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible
net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. The firm-level control variables are firm
size (log), leverage, firm age (log), number of segments (log), market-to-book (log), R&D, stock return volatility,
free cash flow, return on assets, governance index, CEO ownership, and CEO tenure. All explanatory variables
are lagged two years. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan.
Panel A includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the relative annual binding distance to
the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.3). Panel B includes only those observations in which
the absolute value of the relative annual binding distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth
(h = 0.2). Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level
clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A: Bandwidth h = 0.3
Firm fixed effects First differences OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.18** 0.14**
(3.62) (3.93) (2.63) (2.85) (2.19) (2.06)
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.218 0.277 0.129 0.167 0.278 0.455
Number of observations 872 872 637 637 872 872
Number of firms 268 268 261 261 268 268
Panel B: Bandwidth h = 0.2
Firm fixed effects First differences OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.27** 0.24** 0.19** 0.13
(3.13) (3.56) (2.24) (2.08) (2.08) (1.63)
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.176 0.243 0.160 0.194 0.348 0.533
Number of observations 473 473 348 348 473 473
Number of firms 166 166 164 164 166 166
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Table IA.21: Regression of Number of Connected Directors - Lead
Arrangers and Other Participants
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects, first differences and ordinary least squares (OLS) panel
regressions of the logarithm of one plus the number of connected directors. Connected directors are those that
have a board or non-board position in another firm with outstanding loans that have at least one bank in
common with the firm’s current banks. The sample of banks includes lead arrangers in columns (1)-(3) and
other participants in the loan syndicate in columns (4)-(6). Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes
a value of one if the firm violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth,
and debt-to EBITDA) during the year in at least one quarter. The sample consists of annual observations on
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated
loans data are available from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute
value of the relative binding distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to
Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Number of connected directors Number of connected directors
lead arrangers other participants
Firm FE First diff. OLS Firm FE First diff. OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant violation 0.10 0.25* 0.25* 0.15** 0.24* 0.17**
(1.01) (1.66) (1.70) (1.99) (1.81) (2.15)
Marginal effects (at mean) 0.38 0.94 0.94 0.21 0.33 0.23
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.069 0.149 0.261 0.065 0.144 0.159
Number of observations 623 439 623 623 439 623
Number of firms 207 199 207 207 199 207
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Table IA.22: Characteristics of Independent Directors Appointed af-
ter Covenant Violations
This table reports sample averages of the characteristics of new independent directors appointed in the two years
after a firm first violates a covenant and a matched control group of independent directors. To construct the
control group, a new director is matched to a randomly-chosen independent director in the same firm. In Panel
A the control group includes independent directors retained by the firm for at least two years after the first
violation. In Panel B the control group includes independent directors who are members of the board in the two
years before the first violation and remained in the board for at least two years after the first violation. Director
characteristics are from the BoardEx database. Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions.








Male 0.92 0.88 0.04 1.41 223
Age 55.97 60.20 -4.23 -5.97 223
MBA 0.20 0.13 0.07 1.90 223
Financial education 0.26 0.14 0.12 3.18 223
Audit or finance committee 0.59 0.63 -0.04 -0.77 223
Past audit or finance committee 0.47 0.40 0.07 1.40 223
Past financial role 0.20 0.11 0.09 2.42 223
Financial firm connection 0.22 0.22 0.00 -0.12 223
Financial firm board member 0.15 0.19 -0.04 -1.00 223
Number of board positions 1.96 2.20 -0.24 -1.18 223
Number of past board positions 1.23 1.57 -0.34 -1.96 223
Bank connection 0.71 0.50 0.21 4.58 171
Bank connection - violation 0.65 0.48 0.17 3.56 171








Male 0.92 0.87 0.05 1.65 226
Age 55.75 59.27 -3.52 -5.01 226
MBA 0.20 0.12 0.08 2.46 226
Financial education 0.27 0.17 0.11 2.83 226
Audit or finance committee 0.59 0.59 0.00 0.00 226
Past audit or finance committee 0.46 0.32 0.14 2.94 226
Past financial role 0.21 0.12 0.09 2.45 226
Financial firm connection 0.23 0.22 0.01 0.24 226
Financial firm board member 0.16 0.19 -0.03 -0.75 226
Number of board positions 2.00 2.46 -0.46 -1.60 226
Number of past board positions 1.27 1.35 -0.08 -0.48 226
Bank connection 0.72 0.40 0.32 6.31 174
Bank connection - violation 0.65 0.33 0.32 6.31 174
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Table IA.23: Regression of Firm Policies - Collapsed Observations
This table presents estimates of regressions of investment, financing, payout, volatility and CEO compensation
around the time of covenant violations. A covenant violation occurs if the firm violates at least one out of four
covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in at least one
quarter. The firm-level control variable is firm size (log). New appointment is a (treatment group) dummy
variable that takes a value of one if there is an increase in the number of independent directors between year
0 and year 2. After is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in the post-violation period. Panel A
presents estimates in which the dependent variable is capital expenditures (scaled by lagged property, plant
and equipment), net debt issues, net equity issues, SEO proceeds, changes in dividends (all scaled by lagged
total assets), and changes in the standard deviation (annualized) of return on assets (ROA) over the last eight
quarters. Panel B presents estimates in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of CEO total pay, salary,
bonus, value of option grants (grant-date Black-Scholes value) or value of restricted stock grants (grant-date
fair value). The sample consists of annual observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)
non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan. The data is
collapsed into two periods: before violation (years -3, -2, and -1) and after violation (years 2, 3, and 4). Refer
to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A: Investment, Financing, Payout and Volatility
Net debt Net equity SEO Volatility
Investment issues issues proceeds Dividends of ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New appointment × After 0.066 0.022 0.037* 0.027* -0.002** -0.006**
(1.33) (0.98) (1.74) (1.76) (-2.20) (-2.10)
After -0.094** -0.048*** -0.022 -0.024* 0.002** 0.003
(-2.36) (-3.34) (-1.38) (-1.89) (2.25) (1.24)
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.118 0.101 0.038 0.071 0.073 0.053
Number of observations 236 236 236 236 234 230
Number of firms 118 118 118 118 118 118
Panel B: CEO Compensation
CEO CEO CEO CEO CEO
Total pay (log) Salary (log) Bonus (log) Option (log) Stock (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
New appointment × After 0.129 -0.033 -0.256 0.637** 0.098
(1.08) (-0.57) (-1.10) (2.27) (0.27)
After 0.139 0.135*** 0.288* -0.488* 0.726**
(1.47) (3.57) (1.90) (-1.82) (2.49)
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.326 0.461 0.146 0.095 0.472
Number of observations 233 233 206 185 115
Number of firms 118 118 117 110 80
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Table IA.24: Regression of Number of Independent Directors -
Cross-Sectional Variation
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the logarithm of the number of independent
directors. Covenant violation is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm violates at least one
out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA) during the year in
at least one quarter. The specification interacts an indicator for a group of firms with the covenant violation
dummy and control variables (firm size, leverage, firm age, number of segments, market-to-book, R&D, stock
return volatility, free cash flow, return on assets, governance index, CEO ownership, and CEO tenure). Panel
A reports the estimates for the lending relationship proxies. The past loans ≥ 2 group includes firms that
had at least two historical lending relationships (only term loans) with the lead arranger in the current loan
syndicate and the past loans < 2 group includes all other cases. The past loans ≥ 5 group includes firms that
had at least five historical lending relationships (all loans) with the lead arranger in current loan syndicate
and the past loans < 5 group includes all other cases. The rated firm group consists of firms with a S&P
credit rating and the unrated firm group includes all other cases. Panel B reports the estimates for the loan
repayment and covenant slack proxies. The large loan and small loan groups include firms with ratio of loan
amount (at origination) to assets above and below the median. The short maturity and long maturity loan
groups include firms with residual loan maturity below and above the median. The high binding distance and
low binding distance groups include firms with binding distance at origination above and below the median.
The high tightness and low tightness groups include firms with tightness at origination above and below the
median. All explanatory variables are lagged two years. The sample consists of annual observations on Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for which syndicated loans data
are available from DealScan. The sample includes only those observations in which the absolute value of the
relative binding distance to the covenant threshold is less than the bandwidth (h = 0.4). Refer to Table A1 in
the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A: Lending Relationships
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Past loans ≥ 2 0.32*** 0.30***
(4.41) (3.43)
Past loans < 2 0.13 0.17
(1.40) (1.49)
Past loans ≥ 5 0.30*** 0.25***
(3.15) (2.87)
Past loans < 5 0.18** 0.22**
(2.25) (2.23)
Unrated firm 0.26** 0.39***
(2.27) (2.61)
Rated firm 0.23*** 0.16**
(2.95) (2.19)
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.204 0.305 0.199 0.308 0.188 0.289
Number of observations 665 665 665 665 665 665
Number of firms 222 222 222 222 222 222
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Panel B: Loan Repayment and Covenant Slack
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Large loan 0.27*** 0.26***
(3.49) (2.83)
Small loan 0.10 0.16
(1.07) (1.52)
Short maturity 0.32*** 0.40***
(2.98) (3.27)
Long maturity 0.21*** 0.18**
(2.94) (2.56)
High binding distance 0.35** 0.38**
(2.15) (2.21)
Low binding distance 0.23*** 0.22***
(3.24) (3.09)
High tightness 0.23** 0.33**
(2.13) (2.44)
Low tightness 0.19*** 0.13**
(2.63) (2.07)
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.179 0.275 0.199 0.286 0.185 0.285 0.207 0.338
Number of observations 658 658 665 665 665 665 665 665
Number of firms 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
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Figure IA.1: Number of Non-Independent Directors and Binding
Distance to Covenant Threshold
This figure shows nonparametric regression estimates of number of non-independent directors (two years after
violation) on the relative binding distance to the covenant threshold. A covenant violation occurs if the firm
violates at least one out of four covenants (current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, and debt-to-EBITDA)
during the year in at least one quarter. Panel A presents estimates using all covenant violations, and Panel
B presents estimates using only the first covenant violation for each firm. The sample consists of annual
observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) non-financial firms from 1994 to 2008 for
which syndicated loans data are available from DealScan.
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Figure IA.2: Ratio of Independent to Non-Independent Directors -
SEC Sample
This figure shows the cross-sectional average and 95% confidence interval of the ratio of independent to non-
independent directors in the four years before and after a covenant violation. A covenant violation occurs if
the firm reports a financial covenant violation in SEC’s 10-Q or 10-K filings. The sample consists of annual
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